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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE CLASSROOM:
LIBRARY BOOK REMOVALS AND THE
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of ac-
quiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.
— 9 Writings of James Madison 103, quoted
in Board of Education v. Pico, 102 S. Ct.
2799 (1982)
In the past decade, the books and curricula of our nation's public high
school students have become the focal point of several federal court decisions,'
as well as the topic of many legal commentaries.' Historically, courts have ac-
corded local school authorities broad powers to determine what books local
school children could and could not read. 3 Increasingly, however, courts are
recognizing that many book removal decisions by school boards may infringe
upon the first amendment rights of high school students.' In cases brought dur-
ing the last decade, teachers, students and parents have challenged the deci-
sions of local school boards to remove literature from school libraries. In
general, these cases involved the same operative facts. School boards, exercis-
' See generally Pratt v. Independent School District No. 831, Forest Lake, 670 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1982); Pico v. Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26, 638
F.2d 404, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982); Bicknell
v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Board of Education
Arapahoe School District, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); President's Council, District 25 v. Community School
Board No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp.
679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979);
Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of Chelsea., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass.
1978).
2 Recent Commentaries appear in the following law review articles: Orleans, What
Johnny Can't Read: "First Amendment Rights" in the Classroom, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 1 (1981); Niccolai,
The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 23 (1981), Note, What Johnny
Can't Read.' School Boards and the First Amendment, 42 U. Pinr. L. REV. 653 (1981); Note,
Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 Colaum. L. REV. 1092 (1980); Comment, Censor-
ship in the Public School Library — State, Parent and Child in the Constitutional Arena, 27 WAYNE L.
REV. 167 (1980).
All of these commentaries, however, were published before 1982, and do not contain a
discussion of the recent United States Supreme Court holding in Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct.
2799 (1982). For a discussion of Pico and its significance, see infra notes 339-435 and accompany-
ing text.
For a discussion of the traditional power exercised by school boards in this area and
the general reluctance of the courts to intervene in local school affairs, see infra notes 25-34 and ac-
companying text.
E.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 451 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
It has been argued that the increased concern of the courts in the actions of school boards is the
result of at least three important factors. First, the greater importance given to the role of public
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ing their traditional authority, have been sued for removing politically' or
morally6 controversial books from public high school libraries.' The
challengers in such cases have charged that school boards, in removing certain
books from school libraries or curricula, have overstepped their authority and
have violated the students' first amendment rights.a The defendant school
boards, in turn, generally claim a high degree of discretion concerning the
selection and proscription of books and academic courses due to the nature of
school systems and the subsequent need for local authorities to make educa-
tional policy. The central legal issue in the recent challenges to local school
board removals of literature from school libraries and curricula, therefore, is
whether secondary students are protected by the first amendment against such
removals.
Despite the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Pico, 9 no consistent standard for determining whether a local school
board's action intrudes upon rights guaranteed by the first amendment has
emerged. The results of cases have varied among districts and circuits. 'a The
thesis of this note considers the reason for these varying and often conflicting
results. It suggests the reason is, in short, that some courts have recognized a
first-amendment right of access to information as the constitutional right in-
volved in book removals, while others have rejected the concept of a right of ac-
cess and have analyzed the issue according to the more traditional first amend-
ment freedom of expression doctrine." This note proposes that courts focusing
on a first amendment right of access present the best standard for reviewing
whether school boards have violated the first amendment rights of high school
students in removing certain literature from school libraries and curricula.
education; secondly, the fact that more people are turning to the courts for resolution of such con-
flicts; and third, the apparent inability of legislatures to deal effectively with such controversial
issues. For a more complete discussion of these and other factors, see Shannon, The New Tactics
Used by Plaintiffs in Imposing Their Views on, or Enforcing Their Rights Against, Public School Boards —A
Commentary, 2 J. L. & EDUC. 77, 77-80 (1973).
E.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 579, 582 (6th Cir.
1976).
6 E.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D. N.H. 1979).
In Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979), the
Nashua Board of Education removed issues of "Ms. Magazine" from the library of the senior
high school. Id. at 1272. In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454
F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the school committee removed an anthology of writings by
adolescents entitled "Male and Female Under 18" on the grounds that certain selections con-
tained objectionable language. Id. at 704-05. For the facts and opinion of the federal district court
in Right to Read, see infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
a E.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 451 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir.
1976); President's Council v. Community School Board, 457 F.2d 289, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1972).
9 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). For a discussion of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bd.
of Educ. v. Pico, see infra notes 339-435 and accompanying text.
t° For an analysis of the difficulties of using traditional first amendment balancing pro-
cedures in the book removal area, from both a practical and conceptual standpoint, see Orleans,
What Johnny Can't Read: "First Amendment Rights" in the Classroom, 10 J. I.. & Enuc. 1, 7-8 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Orleans].
" Cases not recognizing the first amendment right of access to information in the con-
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This conclusion is based on four lines of analysis. First, recent Supreme Court
cases, including the plurality opinion in Board of Education v. Pico,' 2 have
established that the right of access to information is a corollary of the tradi-
tional first amendment right of free speech or expression." Second, this right of
access, to at least some degree, has been held to extend to minors." Third,
Supreme Court decisions discussing the concept of "academic freedom" have
ruled that first amendment rights generally extend to secondary students while
in school." Finally, by recognizing that the removal of a book more closely im-
plicates the right of access to information than freedom of expression, such an
approach not only remains consistent with constitutional precedent in this
area, but also represents the most realistic view concerning what rights may ac-
tually be restricted when a book is removed from a library shelf.' 6
This note begins by tracing the historical development of the first amend-
ment rights of high school students generally. The starting point of this
historical survey is a time when courts were unwilling to review school board
decisions because such policymaking was considered to be in the exclusive
province of local authorities." Next, the historical survey focuses on how the
concepts of "academic freedom"" and the classroom as a marketplace of
ideas" developed, and how these principles effectively limited the scope of local
school board discretion. This historical section concludes with a discussion of
the recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing the first amendment right of
access to information generally as a corollary right to that of free speech, and
the applicability of a right of access to minors in a secondary school setting." In
text of school library book reniovals include Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, rehearing and
rehearing en bane denied (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982); President's Council v. Com-
munity School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
For cases recognizing secondary school students' first amendment rights of access to infor-
mation, see, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School DistriCt, 670 F.2d 771. (8th Cir. 1982); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Sheck v. Baileyville School Com-
mittee, 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
12 102 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
13 For a discussion of the recent Supreme Court cases recognizing a first amendment
right of access to information in contexts other than book removal cases, see infra notes 67-119 and
accompanying text.
" See infra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
16 This is based upon the proposition that the removal of a book will not usually restrict
a student's freedom of expression, but rather, his ability to gain access to that book and the ideas
contained therein. Some courts, however, have found in favor of the student/plaintiffs despite
adhering to the first amendment doctrine of freedom of expression while denying recognition of
the right of access to information. See, e.g., Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, rehearing and rehear-
ing en bane denied (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). For a discussion of the reasoning of
the Second Circuit in Pico, see infra notes 220-47 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
18 For a complete discussion of the concept of "academic freedom" and an analysis of
the cases espousing the academic freedom principle, see infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
19 For a complete discussion of the concept of the classroom as a "marketplace of
ideas," see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 67-119 and accompanying text.
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Section II, the book removal cases are discussed in depth. The development of
the major legal issues in these cases over the period of a decade is analyzed in
the context of the courts' attempts to construct a standard of review. Included
in this analysis is a discussion of the two latest lower federal court decisions in
this area, both decided in January of 1982. 21
 This section concludes with a
discussion of the recent Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. Pico,"
when the Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit." This note will discuss the significance of the Pico deci-
sion, and will examine the critical questions left unanswered due to the use of
multiple standards of review by the individual Justices. 24
Because of the failure of the Supreme Court to hand down a clear standard of
review by which federal courts may evaluate future book removal cases, the last
section of this note recommends a model standard of review which is based
upon recognition of the students' limited first amendment right of access to in-
formation. In presenting this recommended standard of review, this note draws
upon the analysis and reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pico, as well as the
principles espoused by several of the lower federal courts to hear book removal
cases in the 1970's and early 1980's.
I. THE ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN EDUCATION
This section traces the historical development of the role of the first
amendment in American education, beginning at a time when courts
categorically rejected challenges to local school board authority and decision-
making discretion. It is shown how the courts gradually began to recognize that
the Constitution may impose at least some restrictions on the scope of school
board authority, and how this early recognition of constitutional limitations led
to the development of concepts such as "academic freedom" and the "market-
place of ideas." This section concludes with a discussion of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions recognizing a first amendment right of access
to information in various factual contexts other than schoolbook removals.
A. Early School Board Discretion
Local school boards traditionally have exercised broad discretion in
determining educational policy for their school systems." In the 19th century,
2 ' See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Sheck v.
Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
'2 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
23 Id. at 2812.
24 See infra notes 415-35 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Bishop v. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 43 N.E. 191 (1896); Watson v. Cam-
bridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893). See Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of
School Boards to Select and Remove High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 457,
458-60 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, First Amendment Limitations!. This article provides
references to many secondary sources concerning the traditional power of school boards and the
reluctance of courts to interfere in local education policy matters. Id. at 458-59.
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education was considered a legislative power of the states, which the states
either could exercise themselves or delegate to local authorities. 26 Courts
viewed the responsibility for education systems as being so entrenched in the
legislative powers of the states that they were reluctant to review the decisions
of local school authorities. 27
 Until at least the 1920's, courts adhered to this
view toward public education, and avoided limiting the discretion of local
school boards. 28 As a result, state legislatures could regulate their own school
systems and were limited only by the confines of their own state constitutions. 29
The exclusive authority accorded to state and local officials over our na-
tion's school systems could be traced to three traditional educational theories.
The first of these theories stemmed from the lack of a constitutional right to an
education. Since attendance at school was perceived by the courts as a privilege
only, it was deemed appropriate that school boards could extensively condition
a student's presence in school.'° This "privilege" theory suggested that since
there was no constitutional guarantee to an education, a school board was
justified in exercising broad discretion in its educational policymaking.
The second theory which supported the exercise of broad discretion by
school boards was derived from the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. 3 '
The doctrine in loco parentis suggested that school authorities were standing in
place of the child's parents while the child was at schoo1. 32 Due to the implied
responsibility placed upon school officials by this doctrine, it was believed that
school boards should be granted broad discretion in carrying out their duties.
The third theory supporting this broad grant of authority to local school of-
See also Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct
and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
stein]. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the exercise of this power, as well as the
sources of school board authority. Id, at 384-87.
" See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 hid. 462, 468-69, 23 N.E. 946, 947
(1890), discussed in MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 115-16 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as MORRIS].
27 See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark, 122 Ind. at 469, 23 N.E. at 948. The Indiana Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Clark stated: "It cannot be possible that the courts can interfere with this
legislative power, and adjudge that the legislature shall not adopt this method or that method;
for, if the question is at all legislative, it is so in its whole length and breadth." Id. See Note, First
Amendment Limitations, supra note 43, at 460.
28 See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
29 MORRIS, supra note 26, at 115.
" See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (cer-
tain students excluded from a land grant college for refusal to participate in military training on
religious grounds). Hamilton has been interpreted to support the sweeping proposition that the
state may require individuals to compromise their religious convictions as a condition to their at-
tendance of a state university. Note, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 25, at 458 n.10. But see
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Bd., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.3 (1969) (limiting the effect
of Hamilton by stating that the decision "cannot be taken as establishing that the State may im-
pose and enforce any conditions it chooses upon attendance at public institutions of learning
however violative they may be of fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
31
 See Note, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 25, at 459.
32 See id. at 459 n.11, citing E. REUTTER, THE COURTS AND STUDENT CONDUCT 3
(1975). See also Goldstein, supra note 25, at 377-84.
1476	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1471
facials was the "socialization theory."" This theory suggested that the
classroom is essential to socialization of the young, and that certain educational
choices made by school authorities are acceptable because they reflect local
community standards which the students should learn." The combination of
these three theories lodged a high degree of discretion in local school authorities
and the courts were reluctant to interfere. Gradually, however, the authority of
school officials eroded as courts became more willing to exercise jurisdiction
over educational matters.
B. Early Limitations on School Board Power
The broad discretion historically enjoyed by school boards in. the pro-
mulgation of their policies was narrowed by two Supreme Court decisions in
the 1920's. In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Supreme Court indicated in a landmark
decision that certain decisions of local and state school authorities may violate
the Constitution. 36
 In Meyer, the Court overturned a Nebraska law prohibiting
the teaching of foreign languages to young children." In Pierce v. Society of
Sisters," the Court sustained a challenge by parochial and other private schools
to an Oregon law which required children to attend public schools." Both
Meyer and Pierce were decided upon fourteenth amendment considerations, the
" See Note, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 25, at 459 n.13, and articles cited
therein.
5+ Id.
" 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36 Id. at 403.
" Id. at 397, 403. The purpose of the law was to discourage the teaching of foreign
languages to immigrant children, thus eliminating any danger to society which may result from
such activity. Id. at 398.
Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority in Meyer, found that the law violated the
fourteenth amendment by materially interfering with "the calling of modern language teachers,
with opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the
education of their own." Id. at 401. Thus, even though the rationale for the decision is based
more on fourteenth amendment considerations of "personal liberty" than on first amendment
considerations of free speech, the roots of future concepts of academic freedom can be seen in the
language of the Meyer opinion.
Commentators have suggested that Meyer represents an extension of the Lochner era's
traditional protection of economic rights under the guise of "fundamental values" to a protection
of non-economic personal liberties. See, e.g., GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CASES AND
MATERIALS 571 (10th Edition, 1980) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER).
39
 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39 Id, at 511, 536. Justice McReynolds once again wrote the majority opinion in Pierce
and reiterated views contained in Meyer concerning the intrusion of law into the rights of the
parents and guardians of the children affected by interfering with their liberty to bring up and
educate their children in the manner they desired. Id. at 518-19. The Court stated that there was
no "general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who would nur-
ture and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 293, 298-99 (1927) (the Court struck
down a statute excessively controlling teachers, curriculum, and textbooks in foreign language
schools).
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Court holding that the actions of the school authorities in those cases invaded
the "personal liberty" of the parents in choosing how to bring up their own
children." The cases, therefore, did not raise questions concerning the first
amendment rights of the students and teachers involved. Taken together,
however, these cases indicated that actions by states with respect to their school
systems did not enjoy the finality once thought to exist, and that the United
States Supreme Court was willing to recognize certain constitutional limita-
tions on the exercise of state educational decision-making.
Twenty years after Meyer, in 1943, the Court analyzed the relationship
between a school board's authority and the first amendment in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette.'" In that case, the Court invalidated the
school board's resolution which had required all teachers and students to par-
ticipate in saluting the flag, and provided that a refusal or failure to do so
would be treated as "insubordination," resulting in expulsion." The Court, in
finding that the flag salute constituted an utterance, and therefore a form of
communication," concluded:
. the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and in-
vades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official con-
trol. 44
In reaching this conclusion, the Court suggested that the first amendment is
critical to protecting individualism and cultural diversity in society.'" In addi-
tion, the Court in Barnette determined that an argument based on both the four-
teenth amendment principles articulated in Meyer and Pierce and the free speech
clause of the first amendment was stronger than an argument based on the
fourteenth amendment alone." Thus, in Barnette, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the first amendment may act as a significant impediment
to unbridled local school board discretion.
4° See supra note 37.
" 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
42 Id. at 628-29, 642.
4' Id. at 632.
44 Id. at 642.
45 Id. at 641-42.
46 Id. at 639. The Court suggested that a fourteenth amendment due process claim may
be overcome with a showing of a "rational basis" by the state. When a violation of the first
amendment is invoked as well, however, the vagueness of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause disappears with the specific prohibitions of the first amendment constituting its standard.
Freedoms of speech, press and religion, according to the Court, may not be infringed on such
slender grounds. The Court in Barnette concluded:
They [first amendment guarantees] are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to the interests which the State may lawfully protect.
It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears
directly upon the State, it is the more specific limiting principles of the First
Amendment that finally govern this case.
Id.
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Although Barnette seemed to open the door for increased intervention by
courts into areas traditionally considered within the exclusive realm of local
authorities, cases decided after Barnette and prior to the 1960's indicated that
courts still were willing to defer to the broad policymaking powers of local of-
ficials. 47
 In general, court reversals of school board decisions were limited to
cases involving the establishment clause of the first amendment. In these cases,
courts were unwilling to allow school boards to compromise the religious beliefs
of students or to discriminate among students based upon their attendance at
parochial rather than public schools." Until the 1960's, however, Barnette re-
mained the only Supreme Court decision invalidating a local school board
" See Note, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 25, at 461 n.22, citing Board of Direc-
tors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) (married student excluded from extracur-
ricular activities); In re Kornblum, 70 N.Y. Dep't R. 19 (1949) (refusal of school board to pur-
chase a periodical for use in a library); State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175
N.E.2d 539 (1961) (exclusion of pregnant student). But see Rosenberg v. Board of Education, 196
Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949). This case, like the other cases cited
above, is an example of a court affirming the action of a school board. However, the rationale
used by the court here reflects a much greater concern for the concept of freedom of speech and
thought in the classroom. In Rosenberg, the court rejected the bid of parents to have the school
board remove books on the grounds that they were objectionable to the Jewish race. Id. at 544, 92
N.Y.S.2d at 346. The court held that the discretion of local school officials in determining the
direction of the school system should not be interfered with in the absence of actual malevolent
intent. Id. Thus, even though the court in Rosenberg supports the proposition that school boards
should have a high degree of discretion in book and curriculum choice, the reasoning behind this
holding seems to be based more on a concept of academic freedom than on the power of local
authorities.
as See generally Note, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 25, at 461 n.23, citing Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (books and other educational materials may be provided by
state to parochial schools); Board of Education v. Allen, 393 U.S. 236 (1968) (state may loan
textbooks to parochial school students); School Dist. of Abington v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (bible reading may not be required in schools); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(school authorities may not write official school prayers); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) ("release time" program which allows public school students to leave for religious instruc-
tion held constitutional); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (program using
schools for religious instruction unconstitutional as violative of the establishment clause); Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state may provide bus transportation to sectarian
schools).
See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Here the Court struck down a
" monkey law" in the state of Arkansas which prohibited the teaching of Darwinian theories on
the grounds that the law favored one religious view, namely, the Judeo-Christian concept of the
creation contained in the Book of Genesis. Id. at 107-09. The Court, in its opinion, put this case
in its historical context:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts, however, have not failed
to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essen-
tial to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of
belief. By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not
directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values. On the other hand, "the vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools."
Id. at 104, quoting in part Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (emphasis added]. The
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regulation on the grounds that it violated the free speech clause of the first
amendment.
C. "Academic Freedom" in the 1960's
The concept of "academic freedom" emerged in the Supreme Court's
decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York." The
Keyishian opinion, in considering the question of academic freedom, 5° estab-
lished a foundation for future decisions involving first amendment rights in the
schools. Its significance lies in the fact that the Keyishian Court recognized that
the protections of the Constitution extended to those in the classroom environ-
ment. 51
In Keyishian, the Court struck down a New York regulation which sought
to prevent the appointment or retention of subversives in state employment."
Specifically, New York state officials attempted to block the retention by the
state university of certain state university employees who were considered, by
the state, to be subversive." The Keyishian Court held that even though the
purpose of the state in this case was legitimate, the means chosen for attaining
that state purpose were overbroad. The Court declared that states may not
" . broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." 54
 In discussing the place of the first amendment in the
classroom, the Court stated:
standard of "direct and sharp implication" was also used in several cases involving book
removals by school boards. For a discussion of this standard in the book removal context, see infra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
5° Id. at 603. See generally Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J. L.
& Enuc. 23, 26 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Niccolai].
Court acceptance of the concept of academic freedom has been slow and gradual in its
development. For a discussion of the meaning and the limited role of academic freedom in
universities before Keyishian, see Note, Developments in the Law — Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L,
REV. 1045 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developments in the Law — Academic Freedom]. It has
been noted that the development of academic freedom with respect to teachers may have been
slowed by a general reluctance of the courts to intervene in local school affairs and a fear that
academic freedom would lead to improper influence on the part of teachers upon their students.
See Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18
WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1494-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nahmod].
" Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
" Id, at 591, 609.
" Id. at 591. The regulation required faculty members at a state university to sign a
certificate stating whether the faculty member was a Communist, if he had been a Communist at
any time, and whether this information had been communicated to the university president. Id.
at 592. The regulation also provided for removal of employees of the state (namely, teachers,
school superintendents, or other employees) on the grounds of acts or utterances of a treasonous
or seditious nature. Id. at 597.
54 Id. at 602, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). It would appear at this
juncture that the Court is employing a standard of review demanding a "legitimate and substan-
tial" government purpose with a least restrictive means test. Kevishian, 385 U.S. at 602. This
standard of review will reappear in some of the book removal cases of the late 1970's. See infra
notes 175, 182 and accompanying text.
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Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of or-
thodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitution-
al freedom is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools. ""
Therefore, the Keyishian decision reflects the desire of the Supreme Court to en-
sure the constitutional protection of those in the classroom environment.
While the Keyishian decision expressly protected only the academic
freedom of state university professors, the Supreme Court in 1969 in Tinker v.
Des Moines Community School District 56 considered the extent to which academic
freedom principles may be applied to high school students. Although the
language of Tinker did not mention specifically "academic freedom," it did
refer to the public schools as a "marketplace of ideas. "" In addition, the deci-
sion itself demonstrated that the Supreme Court was willing to recognize and
protect the first amendment free speech rights of secondary school students. In
Tinker, the Court ruled that a local school board policy prohibiting the wearing
of armbands by students in protest of the Viet Nam war violated the students'
first amendment rights." The Court held that, under the circumstances of the
case, the wearing of an armband was closely akin to "pure speech" and was
therefore entitled to comprehensive protection under the first amendment."
The Tinker Court further ruled that a state may not confine students to the ex-
pression of only those sentiments receiving official approval. 60 The Court noted
that the classroom should be considered a marketplace of ideas," and con-
cluded that education should provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. 62 This
exchange of ideas, in the Court's view, is crucial to the government's interest of
training future national leaders. 63 Therefore, the Court in Tinker concluded
that the first amendment protection of free speech extended into the classroom
and to secondary school students.
In Tinker, the Court employed a two step standard of review. First, it
determined that the school board had interfered with the students' right of ex-
pression, thereby establishing a prima facie constitutional violation. At this
stage, the burden shifted to the state to justify its actions. Under Tinker, the
" Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, citing in part Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
" 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" Id. at 512.
58 Id. at 514.
59 Id. at 505-06. The court cited two cases in support of this proposition, Cox v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), and Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
" Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
" Id. ai 512.
62 Id.
63 Id. The Court here suggests that the training of future leaders depends upon "wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.' " Id.
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state must show that the proscribed expression or manner of expression would
"materially and substantially" interfere with the proper discipline of the
school." If the state cannot carry this burden, its actions would then be struck
down as violative of the first amendment rights of the students.
Thus, the Supreme Court in the 1960's broadened the first amendment
protection accorded to high school students. The Court in Tinker demonstrated
a shift in the traditional view of the judicial system toward the sovereignty of
school boards and their actions. The Court declared that it was unwilling to
favor local school board discretion to the detriment of the constitutional rights
of secondary school students, stating that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate. " 65 Tinker and Keyithian, however, expressly
extended the protection of the first amendment to speakers only. First amend-
ment rights were not expressly recognized for those desiring to hear protected
speech, or to students desiring access to certain books or wanting specific
courses included or retained in their high school curricula. Thus, these deci-
sions recognized no first amendment right of access for high school students.
Before book removal decisions by school boards could be challenged suc-
cessfully under the first amendment, it was necessary that aright of access to
information be recognized as a component of the first amendment. Since the
removal of a book clearly restricts a student's access to that book, and only in
extreme cases could be said to limit a student's right to speak or express
himself, it is apparent that without the development of such a right of access it
would be very difficult for a challenge to a book removal decision to be sus-
tained. This proposition is evidenced by the fact that in those cases where
plaintiffs have successfully challenged book removal policies, the courts have
recognized the right of access to information. 66
D. The First Amendment "Right of Access to Information"
This section will examine the development of the concept of a first amend-
ment right of access, and discuss the extent to which this right has been
recognized with respect to minors. This examination, however, will focus on
the development of this right only in connection with cases outside the book
removal context. The right of access in book removal cases, including the posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Pico, 67 is discussed in those
later sections of the note which analyze the individual book removal cases in
depth." In this section it will be shown that until two recent Supreme Court
64 Id. at 513.
65 Id. at 506.
66 See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Minarcini
v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Sheck v. Baileyville School Com-
mittee, 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
67 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). For a discussion of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, see infra notes 339-436 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 127-435 and accompanying text.
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decisions, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 69
and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 7°
 it was unclear whether there existed
a first amendment right of access. Thus, the first book removal cases, decided
in the early 1970's, addressed the book removal issue prior to the more recent
Supreme Court decisions which provided some basis for recognizing a right of
access under the first amendment. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court
held that in the context of commercial advertising, the first amendment pro-
tects both the speakers and the recipients of speech." In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. , the Court held that the public and the press had a first amendment right of
access to attend criminal trials." The exact nature and extent of this newly
recognized right, however, remained unclear even after the Court's holding in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
One of the earliest discussions by the United States Supreme Court of the
first amendment right of access to information occurred in 1943 in Martin v.
City of Strothers. 73 In Martin, the Court struck down an ordinance which pro-
hibited certain methods of distributing literature door to door. 74
 In holding that
particular methods of distribution were protected by the first amendment, the
Court stated that the first amendment should be given broad scope and should
not be limited simply because certain forms of speech may disturb some peo-
ple." In addition, the Court, in dicta, stated that the first amendment pro-
tected not only the right to distribute literature, but also the right to receive it. 76
Thus, in a cursory manner, the Supreme Court discussed the concept of a first
amendment right of access to information as early as 1943, and more impor-
tantly, provided some suggestion that it was of constitutional dimension. Since
Martin, the Supreme Court has raised the concept of a right to receive informa-
tion in varying contexts, including the right of an individual to possess obscene
film," the right of access to suitable broadcast material, 78
 and the right to hear
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7° 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
71 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757.
" Richmond, 448 U.S. at 576-77.
73 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
7* Id, at 142, 149.
" Id. at 143.
76 Id.
The right of freedom of speech and the press has broad scope. The authors of the
First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if
vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom
embraces the right to distribute literature, . and necessarily protects the right to
receive it."
Id.
" Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65, 568 (1969). In Stanley the Court stated:
It is well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."
Id. at 564.
" Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The Court in Red Lion
held: "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and
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a Marxist scholar speak." In these cases, however, the right of access never
was central to disposition of case. Consequently, the nature and extent of this
right was never fully developed.
Perhaps the Court's earliest clear statement of this first amendment right
appeared in the 1976 decision, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council. H° This case is considered by many to be a landmark decision
in the right of access area." In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court struck
down a Virginia statute prohibiting price advertising by pharmacists. The
statute had been enacted, in part, on the grounds that such price advertisement
by pharmacists constituted unprofessional conduct." The Court voiced its con-
cern for the right of the consumers who brought the action to hear the advertis-
ing, stating that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising .... " 83
 The Court then broadened this statement and
ruled that where a willing speaker exists, freedom of speech protects both the
speaker and the recipients." Thus, in 1976, the Supreme Court appeared to
recognize a first amendment right of access to information in at least one fac-
tual context.
In a more recent case, the Court has indicated that the right of access to
information may have a broader application than that recognized in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy. In the 1980 case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia," the United States Supreme Court held that the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public and to the press." The plurality opinion of
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit
in the guarantees of the first amendment, and that without such a right many
aspects of the freedoms of speech and the press would be eviscerated." It has
been noted, however, that the Justices in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. did not all
agree on the foundation of this right of access to criminal trials within the first
amendment." The concurring opinions of Justices Stevens, Brennan and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not be constitutionally abridged
either by Congress or by the F.C.C." Id.
79
 Kleindienst v. Mandell, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 762 (1972). In Kleindienst, the Court
stated: "In a variety of contexts the Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive in-
formation and ideas ... ' " Id. at 762.
8° 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
81
 Niccolai, supra note 50, at 25.
" Virginia Stale Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749.50, 773.
" Id. at 757.
84
 Id. at 757. "Freedom of speech supposes a willing speaker. But where the speaker ex-
ists, ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and its recipients both."
Id.
65
 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
" Id. at 580.
87 Id. For a complete discussion of a right of access for the public and the press to attend
criminal trials as recognized in Richmond, see Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to a Sex
Crime Trial, 22 B.C.L. REV, 361, 372-75 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The First Amendment
Right of Access].
88 Id. at 372.
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Blackmun were all based upon the relatively unprecedented first amendment
right of access to information. 89 Mr. Justice Stevens, specifically, called Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. a watershed case, since never before had the Court
squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy material was protected by the
Constitution. 9° Stevens suggested that this was the first time the Court had
held an arbitrary interference with access to important information to con-
stitute an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and the press. 9 '
89 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 586-87
(Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
9' Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court, in a 1982 decision, dispelled some of the doubt surrounding the
interpretation of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and the foundation for the right to attend criminal
trials. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), a newspaper unsuc-
cessfully tried to gain access to a rape trial in the Superior Court for Norfolk County, Massachu-
setts. The criminal defendant in the case had been charged with the forcible and unnatural rape
of three female minors. Id. at 2616. The trial judge ordered the courtroom closed, and the
Globe's motion to revoke the closure order was denied. Id. Nine months after the trial had been
completed, the Globe's appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi'Cial Court was held to be
moot. Id. at 2617. In dicta, however, the court ruled that a Massachusetts statute required the
trial be closed during the testimony of minor victims in order to encourage such victims to come
forward with criminal charges and to protect minors from "undue psychological harm at trial."
Id. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that closure with regard to other portions of such a
trial was within the discretion of the trial judge. Id. Upon remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that despite the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. , the state had a genuine interest in protecting the
minor victims in this case, and therefore dismissed the Globe's appeal. Id. at 2617-18. The case
was subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In a 6-3 decision over the dissents of the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
and held that the statutory mandatory-closure rule in effect during the trial violated the first
amendment. Id. at 2618. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first
time that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that case, seven
Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment,
and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Justice Brennan went on to suggest that this right is founded upon two major principles fun-
damental to both the first amendment and the criminal justice system in general. First, the Court
recognized that a major purpose of the first amendment was to " protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs." Id. at 2619, quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Accord-
ing to the Court such protection ensures that individual citizens may "effectively participate in
and contribute to our republican system of government." Id. Second, Justice Brennan suggests
that access to criminal trials serves to foster the appearance of fairness, heighten public respect for
the judicial process, and act as a check upon the system. Id. at 2620. Therefore, after Globe News-
paper Co. , the right of access to criminal trials appears to be grounded in general principles sur-
rounding first amendment guarantees of access to government information as well as a desire to
strengthen the integrity of the judicial process.
The Court observed, however, that this right was not absolute. According to the Court,
a state may successfully close a trial for the purpose of denying access to sensitive information
when two constitutional tests are met. First, the state must demonstrate that the closure is neces-
sitated by a "compelling governmental interest." Id. Second, the state must also prove that the
closure order was "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. The Court concluded that, in
this case, the statute in question was overbroad in its scope and therefore unconstitutional. The
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Discussing this right of access in light of the value and importance general-
ly accorded "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate on public issues, 92
Justice Brennan suggested that such public debate, as well as other civic
behavior, must be informed. 93 Brennan concluded, therefore, that "[t]he
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for
the communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication."" It is this crucial need for informed, meaningful com-
munication which led Justice Brennan to the observation that first amendment
guarantees are customarily interposed to protect not only the right to speak,
but further to protect the entire communication between the speaker and the
listener."
In contrast, it is noted that the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger
stressed the more traditional first amendment right of freedom of assembly."
Although not expressly mentioning a right of access to information, the plurali-
ty opinion likewise did not eliminate such a right as a possible basis for its
Court stated that "[s]ection 16A, in contrast, requires closure even if the victim does not seek the
exclusion of the press and the general public, and would not suffer injury by their presence." Id.
at 2621. With respect to the state's asserted interest in encouraging the victims of sex crimes to
come forward with criminal complaints, the Court held that even if the statute effectively ad-
vanced the state's interest, the asserted interest is itself too speculative and intrusive, and would
most likely be insufficient to withstand constitutional attack on those grounds. Id. at 2622.
The reinterpretation of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. by the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. is
important in the context of book removal cases for three reasons. First, the constitutional validity
of a right of access to criminal trials, doubtful after the opinions of a divided Court in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., has been upheld by a clear majority of the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. Second,
this right has been construed to protect the public's access to important government information,
something never before expressly recognized by the Court. The principles underlying this pro-
tected access can be analogized to the need for protecting a student's access to educationally rele-
vant and important information. For a discussion of the important role played by this principle in
a standard of review for book removal cases, see infra notes 437-.440 and accompanying text.
Finally, the Court has set forth a standard of review by which to evaluate challenges involving
this "access-related" first amendment right. The state must prove that it had a compelling gov-
ernment interest and that the means employed were closely tailored to achieve those permissible
ends. For a discussion of the appropriateness of utilizing such a standard of review in book
removal cases, see infra notes 441-52 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93 Id. Justice Brennan, in a footnote, reiterated the view that:
The . . . First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment
to intelligent self-government. It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular
self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing
sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues. And public
debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this
Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt
of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression. (Footnotes and cita-
tions omitted).
Id, at 587 n.3, citing Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
93 Richmond Newspapers, Inc,, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 577-78, discussed in Note, The First Amendment Right of Access, supra note 87, at
372.
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ultimate finding. Further, the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, although
appearing to ground its reasoning in the traditional free speech and press
analysis, stated in a footnote that "[t]he right to speak implies a freedom to
listen," and that "[t]tle right to publish implies a freedom to gather informa-
tion.'' Therefore, the reciprocal right of access to protected speech appears
implicit in Stewart's finding that the public and the press should be accorded
access to criminal trials.
Thus, these two recent Supreme Court decisions strongly support the con-
tention that the right of access to information rises to the level of receiving pro-
tection under the first amendment to the Constitution. In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, in the context of commercial advertising, the Court expressly stated
that the first amendment protects both the speaker and the recipients of
speech." In Richmond Newspapers, Inc., three Justices found the public right of
access to a criminal trial to be based at least in part on a first amendment right
of access to information," while a fourth recognized the first amendment right
to speak implies a freedom to listen.'" Although the Supreme Court has not
defined the exact nature and extent of a right of access to information, the
language of these cases strongly suggests that where the speech of a willing
speaker is protected by the first amendment, those same constitutional protec-
tions should be accorded a willing listener's desire to hear or gain access to that
protected information.
The right of access to information with respect to minors, however, has
received less attention and less protection than the right of access accorded
adults. For example, in 1968, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York'°'
upheld a statute which prohibited selling to minors certain "girlie" magazines
which would not have been obscene if shown to adults. 102 The rationale of the
Court in upholding the restricted access rights of minors was twofold. First, the
Court reasoned that the statute aided parents in preventing their children from
gaining unlimited access to such adult material.'" Second, the Court stated
that the law reflects the concern of the legislature regarding the potential harm
to young children from such access.'" With these factors in mind, the Court in
Ginsberg established a "variable obscenity" standard which treats minors dif-
ferently than adults in evaluating the constitutionality of a state's prohibition
on selling obscene material."' This approach deems a statute which defines
97 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 599 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Bransburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
'a Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 767 (1976).
99 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
100 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 599 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
1 ° 2 Id. at 631-33.
109 Id. at 639-40.
'" Id, at 640-41.
"" Id. at 631-33. For a discussion of the "variable obscenity" standard of Ginsberg which
treats minors differently from adults, see Note, Regulation of Programming Content to Protect Children
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obscenity in terms of an appeal to the prurient interest of minors to be constitu-
tional.' 06 Therefore, under Ginsberg, a state may legitimately restrict the access
of minors to material which is constitutionally protected with regard to adult
consumption.
The rationale of Ginsberg was extended to the broadcast medium in F. C. C
v. Pacifica Foundation.'" In Pacifica, the Court upheld the authority of the
F.C.C. to regulate the transmission of patently offensive material over the air-
waves. 108
 The Court reasoned that the accessibility of minors to the broadcast
medium coupled with the Ginsberg concerns for a minor's well-being justify
regulation of controversial yet constitutionally protected adult broadcast
material.'" Thus, Ginsberg and Pacifica demonstrate that the right of access to
information for minors may be limited by the state's interest in protecting
minors from uncontrolled exposure to sexually explicit or offensive materials
which were intended for adult consumption."°
The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that minors do have some
first amendment rights of access to communicative materials. In Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 11
 the Court struck down as overbroad a local ordinance
which prohibited the showing of films containing nudity by drive-in theatres
when the screens of such theatres were visible from a public street or place. II2
One argument posed by the city in defense of the ordinance was that it was a
legitimate exercise of the city's police power in protecting minors from this type
of harmful visual influence." 3 The Court cited Ginsberg in recognizing that a
state or municipality legitimately may adopt more stringent controls on com-
municative materials available to youths than on material available to
adults." 4
 The Court also stated, however, that minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant measure of first amendment protection, and that the government may bar
public dissemination of protected materials to them only in relatively narrow
and well-defined circumstances."' Specifically, the materials in question must
be considered "obscene" under the Ginsberg test, and therefore be considered
protected with regard to adults and unprotected with regard to minors. The
Court concluded by suggesting that a definition of obscenity must be drawn
After Pacifica, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1377 (1979), cited in Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Con-
stitution, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1092, 1103 n.78 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Schoolbooks].
1 °5 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-33.
'°7 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
l" Id. at 743.
1 °g Id. at 749-50. In fact, the majority in Pacifica allowed regulation of such materials
which would not even be termed obscene according to the Ginsberg test of variable obscenity with
regard to minors. Id. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"° See Note, Schoolbooks, supra note 105, at 1104.
"' 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
112 Id. at 206-07, 213.
"3 Id. at 212.
"4 Id.
115 Id, at 212-13. The term "protected" in this context obviously refers to material pro-
tected with regard to adults, which is subsequently found to be unprotected and subject to state
regulation with regard to minors.
1488	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol.. 23:1471
narrowly when government is attempting to regulate the dissemination of
materials to minors, and that government regulation, through broad or-
dinances such as the one in this case, generally should not be used to protect
the young from certain ideas and images." 6
The Supreme Court in Erznoznik, therefore, made an important statement
concerning the regulation of obscenity with regard to minors. The Court deter-
mined that unless speech is legally obscene as to youths, or subject to some
other legitimate reason for proscription, such speech may not be suppressed
merely to protect minors from images or ideas that a legislative body may
believe to be unsuitable for them."' Thus, unless it can be shown that speech is
obscene as to minors under the Ginsberg standard, it is protected by the first
amendment and may not be suppressed by the state. The Court summed up
this principle in rather sweeping language when it stated: "In most cir-
cumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less ap-
plicable when the government seeks to control the flow of information to
minors.'"" Further, the Court ruled that in those circumstances in which the
government may permissibly deny minors access to certain material, the
regulations effecting such a denial must be drawn narrowly."g
Although the exact nature and extent of the first amendment right of ac-
cess to information has not been fully developed, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions indicate that this relatively new corollary to the traditional free speech
clause will continue to grow in importance. Against this background of the
developing first amendment right of access to information, the book removal
cases have been decided. The first book removal cases were brought while the
concept of a constitutional right of access to information was still in its infancy.
Thus, the courts in these cases were forced to analyze the book removal prob-
lem in terms of the more traditional first amendment values of freedom of
speech and academic freedom with regard to expression only.'" In subsequent
cases, however, when the right of access had attained greater support in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, circuit courts sought to determine whether local
"6 Id. at 213-14.
" 7 Id.
Id.
119 Id. The Court in Erznoznik struck down the ordinance as over-broad, stating:
In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youths from
viewing the films, the restriction is broader than permissible. The ordinance is not
directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it otherwise limited. Rather, it
sweepingly forbids display of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or
breasts, irrespective of the context or pervasiveness. Thus, it would bar a film con-
taining a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes
from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might prohibit
newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers on a
beach. Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors.
Id. at 213. .
120 See, e.g., President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.
1972). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in President's Council, see infra notes 127-43
and accompanying text.
September 1982]	 LIBRARY BOOK REMOVALS 	 1489
book removal decisions had violated the students' right of access to the re-
moved material. 121 In such cases the courts were willing to find that book
removals infringed upon the students' right of access rather than measure these
removal decisions against the backdrop of the traditional first amendment doc-
trine of freedom of expression.' 22 Although the right of access standard has
been adopted by two recent lower federal courts, 123 other courts have expressly
rejected the application of such a new first amendment concept. 124
 When the
United States Supreme Court considered the question of book removals in
Board of Education a. Pico, 125 the justices were split on the issue of the application
of a right of access in these cases.' 26 The next section of this note examines the
decisions of the federal courts regarding book removals, concluding with a
discussion of the clouded mandate of the Supreme Court.
II. THE BOOK REMOVAL CONTROVERSY
A. The Early Cases
In its 1972 decision, President's Council a. Community School Board,' 27 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently became the
first federal court to examine the first amendment rights of high school students
in the context of a book removal decision by a local school board. The case in-
volved the removal of "Down These Mean Streets," an autobiography about
growing up in Spanish Harlem, from all the junior high school libraries in
Queens, New York.'" The school board had removed the book after com-
plaints from parents that the vulgar language and explicit sexual interludes
contained in the book would have a detrimental moral and psychological effect
on the school children.'" The plaintiffs in the suit, who included parents,
teachers, and students,'" charged that the removal of the book by the school
' 21 See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra note 66.
123 See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Shack v.
Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
'" See supra note 120. See, e.g., Pico V. Bd.' of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, rehearing and rehearing
en bane denied (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
125 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
128 See infra notes 415-18 and accompanying text.
127 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
' 28 Id. at 290-91. The educational value of the book, besides any literary value, was
stated by the court to be that it acquainted the predominantly whim, middle-class students in the
school with the realities of life for young people in Spanish Harlem. Id. at 291. The resolution of
the school board removing the book completely was later revised to make the book available to
parents only, on a direct loan basis. Id. at 290. This fact, however, was not mentioned by the
court in the body of the opinion, and did not appear to affect the analysis and final resolution of
the constitutional issues raised.
1" Id. at 291.
' 30 Id. at 290. The plaintiffs included present and past presidents of various parent-
teacher associations in the district, students, teachers, parents and guardians, a school librarian
and a principal of a school in the district. Id.
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board had violated their first amendment rights.' 3 ' The court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim, holding that the school board had acted permissibly within the
scope of its authority in removing the book.' 32
At the time the case was heard, the right of access concept had not been
fully developed,'" and it seemed clear that the variable obscenity doctrine of
Ginsberg v. New York, 134
 by itself, did not unquestionably support the recogni-
tion of a minor's right of access to information.' 35 The standard of review
adopted by the court in President's Council was that for a court to interfere in the
daily operation of the school systems, the dispute must "directly and sharply im-
plicate basic constitutional values." 136
 The court stated that the school board's
actions in President's Council did not curtail the freedom to express ideas or to
discuss any subject.'" The court noted further that the students were free to
discuss the books openly in school even after their removal.'" The court ruled
that the students' first amendment right of free expression was not violated, and
that absent such a showing of a direct constitutional violation, local authorities
may remove schoolbooks for reasons of obsolescence or where the books were
improperly selected originally for whatever reason. 13 9
The Second Circuit was careful to distinguish Tinker v. Des Moines Com-
munity School District, where the Supreme Court had upheld, as a form of pro-
tected expression, the constitutional right of secondary school students to wear
armbands to school.'" The court reasoned that in Tinker a form of free speech
was being prohibited. 14 1 In President's Council, the court noted, the students still
were free to discuss the books if they so desired.'" By making this distinction,
131 Id. at 289. The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C.
5 1343(3) (1970). Id.
"2 Id. at 294.
"3 The case generally considered the first to recognize at least a limited right of access to
information, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, was not decided until 1976. For a general discussion
of the decision of the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, see supra notes 80-84 and
accompanying text. For a general discussion of the development of the right of access to informa-
tion in the Supreme Court, see supra notes 69-119 and accompanying text.
L" 390 U.S. 629 (1968). For a discussion of the variable obscenity standard of Ginsberg,
see supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
13 ' The Ginsberg standard acted to prohibit certain material from being shown or
distributed to minors, and, as such, did not expressly recognize a right of access to any specific in-
formation. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
'" President's Council, 457 F.2d at 291. In applying the test of a "direct and sharp" im-
plication of constitutional values, the court in President's Council is adopting the standard of Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) for the establishment of a prima facie constitutional
violation. For a discussion of this standard, and its application in Epperson, see supra note 48.
1 " President's Council, 457 F.2d at 293.
"8 Id.
199 Id. The phrase, "for whatever reason," seems at this point to give school boards a
carte blanche right to remove books without cause. This language is interpreted narrowly by later
decisions. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir.
1976).
140 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1968).
14L President's Council, 457 F.2d at 293.
142 Id.
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the Second Circuit in 1972 made it clear that it was unwilling to extend to high
school students a first amendment right of access to school library books."'
The decision of the Second Circuit in President's Council was appealed to
the Supreme Court. The Court denied certiorari, with Justices Stewart and
Douglas dissenting.' 44 In his dissenting opinion, justice Douglas stated that the
actions of school boards are not immune from constitutional scrutiny, 145
endorsing the concept of academic freedom. 146 Justice Douglas further
recognized the right to hear, to learn, and to know"' and stated that "this right
to know is nowhere more vital than in our schools and universities."" 8 The
opinion noted that the book in question was not alleged to be obscene under
either traditional standards 149
 or the stricter standards for minors set forth in
Ginsberg a. New York. ' 5° Justice Douglas concluded his dissent by stating that
the first amendment requires any regulation of free speech to be "narrowly
drawn" so as to limit such speech in the least restrictive manner possible.'"
This final requirement imposed upon any regulation of expression suggests
that any local policy which is overbroad in its scope, that is, suppresses more
speech than is necessary for the attainment of the permissible goals of the state,
may be struck down as unconstitutional for that reason.'"
The Douglas dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in President's Council
is significant because it recognizes the potential importance of the right of ac-
cess to information in book removal cases and suggests local policies concern-
'" Id. The court in President's Council did not recognize a right of access to information,
and concentrated only on the active aspect of the first amendment. Since speech or thought itself
was not prohibited, the court held that freedom of speech was not violated. Id. Since there was no
showing of such a violation, the removal of a book without such a curtailment of speech did not
present a constitutional issue. Id.
'" 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
'" Id. at 998. In making this statement, Douglas cited several Supreme Court decisions,
including Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), see supra notes 35-37; Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968), see supra note 65; Tinker v, Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1968), see supra notes 56-65.
'" President's Council, 409 U.S. at 998 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Academic freedom has
been upheld against attack on various fronts." Id.
1 " Id. at 999. The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and publish,
but also the right to hear, to learn and to know." Id.
'" Id. In support of this proposition, the opinion cites several cases including Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 763 (1972), see supra note 79; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967), see supra notes 49-55.
"9 Id. at 999. The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States defined obscenity as
"whether to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests." 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
See also Niccolai, supra note 50, at 29.
1 " President's Council, 409 U.S. at 999 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This stricter standard
refers to the variable obscenity standard of Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); see supra
notes 101-06.
'" President's Council, 409 U.S. at 1000 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'" For an example of the Supreme.Court striking down an ordinance as overbroad
under the first amendment, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); see supra
notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
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ing book removals may be struck down as unconstitutionally broad. Justice
Douglas posited the existence of a first amendment right "to hear, to learn,
and to know," which is independent of the first amendment right of expres-
sion) 55 Further, by asserting the importance of this right in schools and univer-
sities, Justice Douglas implied that such a right to know may be violated when
school boards remove books from school libraries.'" Finally, by stating that
any regulation of first amendment rights must be implemented through a
policy narrowly drawn to meet permissible goals justifying such restrictions of
constitutional freedoms, Justice Douglas implied that the means employed by a
school board in effectuating a book removal may themselves be subject to
judicial scrutiny)" If the book removal policies are found to be overbroad in
scope, they may be struck down as unconstitutional.
The concepts of academic freedom and a first amendment right to know,
articulated by Justice Douglas in President's Council, were recognized in 1976 by
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
District. 156 In Minarcini, the court sustained the challenge of five high school
students to removal of books from a school library by the local school board)."
The Minarcini court ruled that the high school students had a first amendment
"right to know," basing this observation on the Supreme Court's holding in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy earlier that year that a right of access to informa-
tion did exist under the first amendment. 158 Despite the fact that the Supreme
Court had mentioned a right of access in earlier decisions, the Minarcini court
suggested that its applicability in book removal cases may have been in doubt
but for the Supreme Court's latest statement in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy. 159 With the recognition of this right of access, unlike the plaintiffs in
President's Council, the plaintiffs in Minarcini could establish a prima facie con-
stitutional violation upon the removal of a book from the school library, since
1 " President's Council, 409 U.S. at 999 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"4 Id.
"3 Id. at 1000 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
'" Id. at 579. The students.sued through their parents as next of friends. Id.
1p8 Id. at 583.
1 " Id. The court noted the importance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy by stating:
We recognize of course, that we deal here with a somewhat more difficult concept
than a direct restraint on speech. Here we are concerned with the right of students
to receive information which they and their teachers desire them to have. First
Amendment protection of the right to know has frequently been recognized in the
past .... Nonetheless, we might have felt that its application here was more doubt-
ful absent a very recent Supreme Court case [Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).].
Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 583. For a complete discussion of the holding of the Supreme Court in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
The court then quoted extensively from the opinion of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
and concluded that the decision firmly served "to establish both the First Amendment right to
know which is involved in our instant case and the standing of the student plaintiffs to raise the
issue." Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 583.
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the very act of removal sharply and directly implicates a constitutional right —
the right to know and to gain access to information.
After a prima facie violation was established, the Minarcini court balanced
the state interests in granting broad discretion to local school boards against the
students' interests of academic freedom 16° and first amendment protection.
The court noted further the constitutional interest in avoiding a "pall of ortho-
doxy" from being cast upon the classroom. 16 ' The court concluded that
reasons such as the obsolescence, poor physical condition of a book, or a lack of
shelf space in the library may constitute legitimate justification for a book
removal: 62 The court emphasized, however, that a school board may not con-
dition the use of a school library merely upon the social or political tastes of the
individual school board members.'" Moreover, the Minarcini court stated that
a library is a "storehouse of knowledge," and that when it is created by the
state for the benefit of the public school students, suc:h a privilege may not be
restricted by the personal tastes of succeeding school boards.' 64 Finally, the
Minarcini court rejected the argument that the availability of the removed book
outside the school library erases any constitutional infringement.'"
In Minarcini, the Sixth Circuit significantly limited the authority of school
boards to remove a book from a public high school library. By recognizing in
secondary school students the right of access to books on the shelves of public
high school libraries, the court made it possible for plaintiffs to establish a
prima facie violation of first amendment rights upon the removal of a book
from the library. Under Minarcini, after this prima facie violation has been
demonstrated, the burden shifted to the school board to prove that it was pur-
suing a legitimate state interest in removing the book.'" According to the
Minarcini court, however, the politibal and social views of individual board
members are not considered legitimate state interests justifying removal.'"
160 Id. at 580. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools." Id., citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104-05 (1968).
161 Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 580.
162 Id. at 581.
163 Id. at 582. Here, in a footnote, the court suggests that it would be consistent with the
first amendment for every library to contain some books with which every citizen has some objec-
tion, as to either subject matter, expression or idea. Id. at 582 n.1.
'" Id. at 581. The court held that the privileges created when the state builds a library
for the benefit of its students are not "subject to being withdrawn by succeeding school boards
whose members might desire to 'winnow' the library for books the content of which occasioned
their displeasure or disapproval." Id. Further, the court ruled that the removal of books in
general places a greater burden upon freedom of the classroom than the prohibition of the wear-
ing of armbands which was struck down on first amendment grounds in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968). Id. at 582. For a complete discussion of the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Tinker, see supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
1 " Id. at 582. "Restraint on expression may not generally be justified by the fact that
there may be other times, places or circumstances available for such expression." Id.
166 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167 Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 582. The only rationale the court found in this case for sup :
porting the book's removal involved the school board's contention that the books in question
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Within two years of Minarcini, two federal district courts, outside the Sixth
Circuit, followed the Minarcini court's lead and sustained challenges to the
removal of literature from high school libraries by local school authorities. In
Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of Chelsea, 168
 the school board
of Chelsea, Massachusetts had removed an anthology of writings by
adolescents from the city's high school library. 169
 Similar to the school board in
Minarcini, the Chelsea school committee argued that the book it removed was
filthy, obscene and disgusting. ' 7° The Federal District Court for Massachusetts
held that the actions of the school board in removing the book violated the high
school students' "right to read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and
ideas.'"" Further, the court observed that the removal was an unconstitu-
tional infringement upon notions of academic freedom, and that students may
not be confined to the expression of only officially approved sentiments. 12
Thus, the court followed the lead of the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini by
recognizing a student's constitutional right of access to information. As in
Minarcini, the district court in Right to Read conceded that every removal of a
book by a school board may not be unconstitutional.'" Echoing the reasoning
of Minarcini, however, the court observed that once the state has acted by plac-
ing a book in a library for the benefit of the students, conditions may not be
placed upon use of the library related solely to the social or political tastes of the
school board members.'" The court ruled that when first amendment values
are implicated, the school board must demonstrate a substantial and legitimate
interest in removing the book.'" The court concluded that when a book is
were "garbage" and "drivel," and that the moral values espoused by the books were ques-
tionable. Id. at 581-82.
168 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
'" Id. at 704-05. The book was entitled "Male and Female Under 18," and was re-
moved primarily due to objections voiced concerning one poem contained in the book written by
a fifteen year old girl entitled The City to a Young Girl." Id.
"° Id. at 711.
"' Id. at 714-15. "What is at stake here is the right to read and be exposed to controver-
sial thoughts and language — a valuable right subject to First Amendment protection." Id. at
714. By adding the words "controversial thoughts and language," the court in Right to Read is
giving the concept of a right of access to information its broadest application yet in the book
removal context. The court in Minarcini had recognized a right to know in the context of high
school libraries, but did not define the scope and extent of this right. See supra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text. The Massachusetts District Court in Right to Read is suggesting that this right
of access may include a broader range of subject matter than may have been envisioned previous-
ly.
'" Id. at 714-15.
173
 Id. at 713.
'" Id. at 712-13, citing Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582
(6th Cir. 1976).
15 Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 713. The court noted that the substantial and
legitimate interest required in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1968), was that the expression in question would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school ... " Id. The court
in Right to Read suggested that Tinker does not require the school board to demonstrate that the
presence of the book in the school library constituted a threat to school discipline. Id. The court
did rule, however, that "some interest comparable to school discipline must be at stake." Id.
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removed because its theme and language are offensive to a school committee,
those challenging such removal are entitled to seek court intervention. 76
In 1979, the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire
followed the trend established in Minarcini and Right to Read and, in Salmi! v.
Nashua Board of Education, overruled the book removal actions of a local school
board.'" In Salvail, the Nashua, New Hampshire Board of Education had
removed all issues of "Ms. Magazine" from the high school library.'" The
Salvail court ruled that the periodical had been removed due to the political
rather than any sexual content of the magazine's issues.'" The court, in
quoting language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, observed that first amendment protections extend to the recipient as
well as to the speaker of protected communication.'" In guarding the first
amendment rights of the students involved, the court held that since the social
and political tastes of board members may not condition the use of public high
school libraries, the action of the school board in removing the magazines was
constitutionally impermissible." In reaching this conclusion, the court held
that the school board had failed to demonstrate a substantial and legitimate
government interest for its invasion of the first amendment rights of the
students.'" Accordingly, the court held that the removal violated the first
amendment rights of the students, and declared the resolutions of the school
board ordering the removal of the magazines to be null and void.'"
Thus, Minarcini, Right to Read, and Salvail accorded public high school
students some degree of first amendment protection of their interests in enjoy-
ing continued access to the books placed in their school libraries. The cases
suggest that when a state establishes public school libraries, students are
thereby vested with a constitutional right of access to the books on the shelves.
When a school board removes a book because it is offensive to the social,
political or moral tastes of school board members, a prima facie violation of this
first amendment right of access to information may be established.'" In order
to justify its actions and rebut the prima facie case, the school board must
demonstrate that it removed the book pursuant to a legitimate and substantial
government interest.'" Therefore, by the end of the decade of the 1970's, the
176 Id. at 712.
177
 469 F. Supp, 1269, 1276 (D. N.H. 1979).
"8 Id. at 1272. The removal was initiated by one member of the Nashua School Board
who objected to the periodical due to "advertisements for vibrators, contraceptives, materials
dealing with lesbianism and witchcraft, and gay material." Id. The board member also objected
to advertisements for what he considered to be a "pro-communist newspaper" ("The
Guardian"). Id.
"g Id. at 1274.
' 88 Id., quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
181 Salta, 469 F. Supp. at 1274.
182 Id. at 1275.
'a' Id. at 1276.
184 See supra notes 158-59, 163, 171, 174, 176, 180 and accompanying text.
i" See supra notes 166-67, 175, 182 and accompanying text. Despite the fact that all three
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Minarcini line of cases had established a clear trend in the federal courts con-
cerning the standard of review to be used in book removal cases. These courts
recognized the first amendment right of access to information to be the con-
stitutional right involved in these cases, and by doing so made it easier for
plaintiffs to bring court actions against the restrictive decisions of local school
boards engaged in the removal of books from high school libraries. In 1980,
however, two circuit court decisions interrupted this development of a right of
access to information in book removal cases.
B. The Standards of Pico and Zykan
In 1980, the Seventh Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp. , 186
and the Second Circuit in Pico v. Board of Education, 187 each addressed the book
removal question. In each case, the student plaintiffs claimed their first amend-
ment rights had been violated when the defendant school boards removed cer-
tain books from the high school libraries and curricula.'" In Zykan, the court
noted the existence of a "qualified right to hear,'" 88 yet ruled that school
boards generally may legitimately remove books based on the personal moral,
social and political views of board members.' 9° As a result, the court in Zykan
ruled that the plaintiffs in the case had failed to demonstrate a prima facie con-
stitutional violation."' In Pico, the Second Circuit ruled that the student plain-
tiffs in that case had established a prima facie case. 192 In reaching this decision,
however, the Pico court did not recognize a first amendment right of access to
information for secondary school students. Rather, the court ruled that pro-
cedural irregularities attendant to the school board's removal action, by chill-
courts require a substantial and legitimate government interest to override a book removal, for
the most part the cases provide little guidance in defining exactly what may constitute this per-
missible state interest. Minarcini stressed the physical condition of the book or the library as in-
terest which may justify removal. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581
(6th Cir. 1976). Salvail held that removal due to the social or political views of the board itself does
not constitute a legitimate interest. Salvail, 469 F. Supp. at 1274.
Salvail and Right to Read suggested that obscenity may be considered a legitimate state in-
terest. Salvail, 469 F. Supp. at 1273; Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of
Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703, 713-14 (D. Mass. 1978). Neither of these cases, however, defines
what constitutes "obscenity" for the purposes of book removals. The court in Salvail stated that
the materials under examination in that case were not "obscene within any recognized legal
definition." Salvail, 469 F. Supp. at 1273. By using this language, the New Hampshire district
court in Salvail avoided setting forth a specific standard for obscenity to be used in these cases.
Likewise, the Massachusetts district court in Right to Read ruled that the language of the
work in question was "tough" but not "obscene." Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 714. In so rul-
ing, the court stressed the important role that rough language may play in giving the develop-
ment of a sensitive theme credibility, and concluded that even though the language may shock,
the words used do, nevertheless, communicate. Id. at 714.
186 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
"7
 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
E" Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1301.
189 Id. at 1304.
1" Id. at 1305.
191 Id. at 1308.
142 Pica, 638 F.2d at 418.
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ing future protected speech in the school, interfered with the students' first
amendment right of freedom of expression." 3
 Consequently, these two cases
represented a break with the trend established in the Minarcini line of cases
which recognized the constitutional right implicated in book removal cases to
be the first amendment right of access to information.'"
In Zykan, the defendant school board removed certain books from the
school library and from the curriculum of the high school.'" The plaintiffs, a
current and a former student of the school, claimed that the removal action
violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights.' 96 The plaintiffs charged
that the action of the school board resulted in a diminution or loss of academic
freedom in the school district, and that the removal action violated their "right
to know."'" They claimed further that the actions of the school board would
continue to have a chilling effect upon the "free exchange of knowledge" in the
school.'" The issue isolated for review by the Zykan court was whether the
plaintiffs had presented a constitutional claim, as the district court below had
dismissed the claim on the grounds that no such constitutional violation had
been demonstrated. 199
In determining what burden the plaintiffs must carry to establish a prima
facie constitutional violation under the first amendment, the court first ex-
amined what right was brought into question by the book removal. 2" The
court noted that concepts such as the "marketplace of ideas" acted to justify
the extension of first amendment protections to the classroom situation under
the principle of academic freedom. 20 ' The court observed that academic
freedom served to emphasize the importance "to the scholarly and academic
communities of being free from ideological coercion. " 202
 The court suggested,
however, that the contours of academic freedom had not been firmly estab-
lished, in the context of secondary schools, as compared to colleges and uni-
versities. 203
The Zykan court, in examining what these contours should be in the case of
high school students, recognized that secondary school students do retain an
interest in freedom of the classroom through a qualified "right to hear. " 204
 The
court noted, however, that the relevance of academic freedom was limited in
the secondary school environment by two factors."' The first factor cited by
'" Id. at 414-15.
194 The Minarcini analysis of a student's right of access to information is discussed supra
at notes 158-59.
195 Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1302 n.2.
196 Id. at 1301.
197 Id. at 1303.
1913 Id.
195 Id. at 1301, 1303.
zoo Id. at 1304.
2" Id.
202 Id.
2" Id.
2" Id.
205 Id.
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the court as limiting the student's right to and need for such freedom was the
level of intellectual development of the secondary school student. 206
 The lower
level of intellectual development of secondary school students, according to the
court, limits the student from taking full advantage of the "marketplace of
ideas," and results in a need for greater guidance in making important educa-
tional decisions on the part of those experienced in such matters. 207
 The second
factor cited by the court was that a school's responsibility not only entails the
academic development of its students, but also includes a broader role in nur-
turing socialization and a sense of civic responsibility. 2" As a result of these
factors, the court concluded that a state has a vital and compelling interest in
"the choice of and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our
young citizens. " 209
In addition, the court suggested that as a result of this need for intellectual
and moral guidance from a body capable of transmitting the mores of the com-
munity, the states have granted broad discretionary powers over such matters
to local school boards. 21 ° Accordingly, the court held that generally it is per-
missible and appropriate for local school boards to base their policy decisions
upon the personal, social, political and moral views of board members. 2 "
206 Id.
207
 Id. The Zykan court, however, does not give specific examples of where this guidance
is needed, nor does it indicate how and why the students' ability to take advantage of the
marketplace of ideas is limited. The court does not explain whether it believes secondary school
students incapable of differentiating between right and wrong, whether they cannot make choices
concerning sexually explicit materials, or whether the students are simply too inexperienced at
discerning what areas of academic inquiry are appropriate or helpful to their own intellectual
development.
This analysis does seem to support the proposition that a core curriculum must be
fashioned for students in order to guarantee they receive certain minimum instruction in these
vital areas. It does not, however, support the contention that students, in their intellectual
development, should not be exposed to a wide variety of reading materials available to them on a
voluntary basis.
208 Id. In this regard, the court stated: "The importance of secondary schools in the
development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad formative role encompassing the
encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental social, political, and moral values that will
permit a student to take his place in the community." Id. The court does not indicate, however,
when a school board's attempts at nurturing certain values in high school students crosses the
fine constitutional line it has drawn and becomes impermissible indoctrination. In short, the
Zykan court proposes an "indoctrination" standard without indicating what types of conduct on
the part of school boards constitute indoctrination.
Moreover, the court fails to explain how the exclusion of reading material from a school
library serves to broaden a student's intellect and civic duty. This concept seems better placed in
an argument favoring the inclusion of certain types of material in a school library. If schools teach
certain social, political and moral views, while including material exploring different views in the
school library, school boards would attain both the goals of instilling civic and moral values in the
students as well as preserving the library as a marketplace of ideas.
2° 9 Id.
210 Id. at 1305. The court cites Indiana state law which gives broad powers to local
school boards in the governance of secondary school matters concerning "curriculum, textbooks
and other educational matters." Id. See, IND. CODE 20-5-2-1; 20-5-2-2; and 20-10.1-4-4 (1980).
2" Id. The court stated, however, that limitations on this broad grant of authority in-
clude the inability of a school board to fire teachers for every random comment made in the
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Therefore, the court ruled that in order for plaintiffs to present a prima facie
constitutional violation in. book removal cases, it must be demonstrated that
the school board has substituted rigid and exclusive indoctrination for the mere ex-
ercise of its right and duty to make general policy decisions concerning the
operation of the schools."' In this respect, the court noted that the plaintiffs
had failed to allege they had been deprived of all contact with the material in
question.'" The court concluded by stating that the plaintiffs had not shown
that the library had been purged of all material offensive to "a single, exclusive
perception of the world," or that the school authorities had prohibited the
students from buying or reading a particular book, or bringing it to school and
discussing it there.'" Therefore, in this case, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated a prima facie first amendment violation, and that, as a
result, no constitutional claim had been presented.'"
Therefore, even though the Zykan court did recognize the interest of sec-
ondary students in a first amendment right of access to information, the court
ruled that certain factors limited the relevance of such a right in the context of
schoolbook removals. 2 ' 6
 Due to the youthful age of the students and their need
for educational guidance, the court concluded that local school authorities
should be given broad discretion in making local educational policy."' Conse-
quently, the court held that school boards may base such removal decisions
upon their own political, social and moral values and beliefs, 218 and in order for
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie violation, they must demonstrate that the
school board engaged in rigid and exclusive indoctrination in effecting a book
removal decision. 219
 Considering the difficulty a plaintiff may be expected to
experience in meeting this prima facie test, it is apparent that the Zykan stand-
ard would resultin at least one serious consequence. It would appear that vir-
tually any case tried under the Zykan standard would be dismissed without the
burden of proof ever being shifted to the defendant school board to justify its
actions. Under these circumstances, therefore, the true motives behind a
school board's book removal actions may never be uncovered.
In another book removal case decided a month after Zykan, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reached different results in finding that a prima
facie constitutional violation had been presented. In Pico v. Board of Education, 220
classroom, religious indoctrination, a flat prohibition of the mention of certain relevant topics in
the classroom, and forbidding students from taking interest in certain topics not directly covered
by the curriculum. Id. at 1305-06.
212 Id. at 1306.
2 " Id.
214 Id. at 1308.
213
2" Id. at 1304. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
21 Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1305. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
219
	 631 F.2d at 1305.
2" Id. at 1306.
22° 638 F.2d 404, rehearing and rehearing en bane denied (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799
(1982).
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the student plaintiffs sued the board of education of the Island Trees Union
Free School District on Long Island for violating their first amendment rights
when they removed ten works from the high school library. 221 The school board
stated that the books were removed because they contained obscenities,
brutality, perversion, and material offensive to Christians, Jews, Blacks, and
Americans in genera1. 222 The removal of the books by the school board,
however, apparently was without serious regard for the established local policy
and procedure for such removals. 223 The Court of Appeals held that due to the
procedural irregularities surrounding the removal of the books, the granting of
the defendant's motion for a summary judgment by the district court was er-
roneous. 224 The court ordered the case remanded for further findings of fact . 225
The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
violation of their first amendment rights of free expression due to the school
board's book removal action. 226 This finding was based, however, upon the
procedural aspects of the school board's actions and not on the substantive
reasons offered by the defendants for the books' removal. 227 In the plurality
opinion, Judge Sifton stated that in this case there had been an unusual and ir-
regular intervention in the school library's operation by persons not routinely
concerned with such matters. 228 Further, Judge Sifton noted that the school
board had not clearly explained the scope and intention behind their action. 229
As a result of the "irregular and ambiguous" nature of their actions, the court
concluded that misunderstandings as to the scope of the board's actions would
be created in the minds of pupils, teachers and librarians. 230 Such
misunderstandings, according to the court, would lead to the chilling and sup-
pression of freedom of expression, as those in the schools would not know ex-
actly what type of speech may be subject to proscription by the school board."'
The court in Pico ruled that once a prima facie violation of the students'
first amendment rights of free expression has been established, the burden
shifts to the school board to demonstrate that it acted because "interests of
discipline or sound education are materially and substantially jeopar-
221 Id. at 406. The court noted that the books involved were: "The Fixer, by Bernard
Malamud; Slaughterhouse Five, by Kurt Vonnegut; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down
These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories by Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes;
Go Ask Alice, by an anonymous author; A Hero Ain't Nothing But a Sandwich, by Alice Childress;
Black Boy, by Richard Wright; Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver;
and an anthology entitled, A Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer." Id. at 407 n.2.
222 Id. at 410.
225 Id. at 409.
224 Id. at 418-19.
225
226 Id. at 414-15.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 414.
229 Id.
Id. at 414-15, 416.
231 Id. at 415, 416.
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dized .... "232 The court declared further that these school board defenses must
be based on reasonable inferences flowing from concrete facts and not abstrac-
tions. 233 If such a government interest can be shown, the actions of the school
board, despite their restrictive effect upon student expression, would be
justified. 234 The court concluded its discussion of the school board's defenses by
imposing a procedural burden upon the state as well. The court declared that a
book removal policy must be narrowly drawn to advance only those social in-
terests which justify it, and may not restrict speech to an extent "greater than is
essential to the furtherance of those [permissible] interests. " 255
While the plurality opinion in Pico was careful to delineate the burden of
the state in book removal cases, bearing in mind that the burden shifts to the
state only upon the showing of a prima facie constitutional violation by the
plaintiffs is important. 236 In Pico, the court did not recognize the students' first
amendment right of access and declared, instead, that the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that their right of free expression had been impermissibly
restricted. 237 In Pico, the court found the students' right of expression to be
violated since the procedural irregularities surrounding the school board's ac-
tions resulted in the chilling of protected speech. 238 The plurality opinion of
Judge Sifton, however, suggested in dicta that a constitutional violation may ex-
ist where a book is removed for the purpose of banning unpopular views. 239
Judge Sifton stated that even where no procedural violations attend the
removal of books by a school board, such actions may be challenged successful-
ly if the plaintiffs can establish that the government interests offered by the
school board to justify its actions were mere pretexts for the suppression of free
speech. 24° The court did state that the thoughtful application of personal stand-
ards of taste, morality, and political belief by school boards to school policy not
only is legitimate but should be encouraged."' The court stated, however, that
the political views and personal taste of the board members must be asserted in
the interest of the children's well-being, and not "for the purpose of
establishing those views as the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the
particular community. "242 Therefore, even if the school board is able to
establish that they did not act in an irregular and ambiguous manner in remov-
ing books from the school library, the plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the government interests offered by the school board are mere
pretexts- for the banning of unpopular views.
292 Id. at 415.
"3 Id.
234 Id.
295
	 citing Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Gil - , 1971).
236 Pico, 638 F.2d at 415.
227 Id. at 414.
238 Id, at 415.
"9 Id. at 417.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
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In setting forth its standard of review, the court in Pico ruled that the con-
stitutional right requiring scrutiny in book removal cases is the freedom of ex-
pression and not a first amendment right of access to information. 243 To
establish a prima facie first amendment violation in these cases, which would
justify the intervention of the federal courts into the daily administration of
school affairs, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the action of the school board
directly and sharply implicated basic constitutional values.'" The Pico court
noted, however, that most book removal decisions are a part of the every day
administration of a school's curriculum and library, and, as a result, would not
impinge either directly or indirectly upon the free expression of ideas.'" The
decision of the Second Circuit in Pico, nevertheless, indicated one example of
when a book removal may implicate first amendment rights of expression to an
extent sufficient to trigger judicial scrutiny. In Pico, when the book removal
decision of a school board was made in an irregular and ambiguous manner,
the danger of first amendment chilling is increased to the point where freedom
of expression may be repressed.'" Under these circumstances, the burden of
proof is shifted to the school board to justify its actions, and the plaintiffs are
subsequently given the chance to prove that the state interests offered by the
school board are mere pretexts for the suppression of certain views. 247
The decisions of the Seventh and Second Circuits in Zykan and Pico repre-
sent a significant retreat from the positions of the previous cases recognizing
the first amendment right of access to information for secondary school
students. The courts in Minarcini, Right to Read and Salvail, in analyzing book
removal cases with reference to the first amendment right of access, held that
school boards may not remove books based upon the social, political and moral
views of individual school board members.'" In these right of access cases, the
burden of proof shifted to the school board to demonstrate they acted pursuant
to a legitimate and substantial government interest in infringing upon the
students' right of access to the removed material.'" The Seventh Circuit in
Zykan observed that students do have an interest in a right to hear, but held that
such a right is limited in secondary school students by reason of their youthful
age and need for educational guidance by local school authorities. 250 As a
245 Ste supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
244 Id, at 414. "Powers to prescribe what may or may not be said and what may or may
not be read — powers which are denied to most public officials, ... are accorded to school of-
ficials because they are the necessary prerequisites to the formation of a school curriculum and
the necessary prerequisites to the stocking of a school library. Courts do not and cannot intervene
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not
directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Id., citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
"' Pico, 638 F.2d at 414.
246 Id. at 414-15
247 Id. at 418.
245 See supra notes 158-64, 171-76, 179-81 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 166-67, 175, 182 and accompanying text.
"° See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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result, the Zykan court ruled that school boards may base their removal deci-
sions upon personal social, political and moral beliefs, and suggested that ab-
sent a showing of rigid and exclusive indoctrination by plaintiffs, the actions of a
school board in removing books from school libraries should be upheld as a
constitutional exercise of their broad discretionary powers in this area. 25 ' The
Second Circuit in Pico failed to recognize even a limited right of access to infor-
mation, analyzing the book removal in that case with reference to the first
amendment right of free expression. 252
 Under the standard adopted in Pico, ab-
sent a showing that the book removal action of the school board sharply and
directly implicated the right of freedom of expression, no prima facie constitu-
tional violation will be found. 255
 After suggesting that such book removals do
not usually impinge upon the freedom of expression, the Pico court held that an
exception to that general rule may exist where, due to the irregular and am-
biguous nature of a school board's book removal action, freedom of expression
may be impermissibly chilled. 254 Under the Pico standard, therefore, a
challenge to the book removal policies of a local school board would be suc-
cessful in only a narrow set of circumstances.
The two latest lower federal court cases to consider the issue of book
removals, decided in early 1982, returned to the reasoning of the Minarcini line
of cases with respect to the recognition of secondary students' first amendment
right of access to information. These cases emphasized that it is the right of ac-
cess which is implicated when a book is removed from a library shelf, and that
this right of access deserves the same scrutiny traditionally attendant to viola-
tions of the more traditional right of free speech and expression. 255 These cases
are important not only because they represent the latest statement of the
federal courts on the issue of book removals, but also in that they examine
realistically the constitutional values implicated by the removal of books from
school libraries and set forth the most cogent and consistent standards of review
to date on this question.
C. The "Right of Access" Revisited
The two latest cases concerning the first amendment rights of high school
students were decided in early 1982. These cases recognize explicitly a
student's first amendment right of access to information, and present cogent
and understandable standards for reviewing book removal decisions. In Pratt v.
Independent School District, 256
 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the first amendment right of access to information of certain
251 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
25+ See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
265 See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Sheck v.
Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
255
 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
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high school students was violated when the defendant school board removed a
controversial film from the school district's curriculum.'" The Pratt court
determined that the plaintiffs had met their prima facie burden by
demonstrating that the board banned the films due to the ideas expressed in
them.'" The burden was then ruled to shift to the school board to establish that
a substantial and reasonable government interest existed in order to justify the
state's interference with the students' right to receive information.'" In Sheck v.
Baileyville School Committee, 260 the United States District Court for the District of
Maine granted plaintiffs' 261 motion for injunctive relief and ordered the local
school board to return a book which it had removed from the school library to
the shelves. 262 The court in Sheck recognized the students' first amendment
right of access, suggesting that the banning of a library book should at least
presumptively implicate this right of secondary students to receive the informa-
tion and ideas written in the book. 263
In Pratt, the local school board ordered that a film entitled "The Lottery,"
which had been used in an American Literature class, be removed from the
school's curriculum.'" In making this decision, the school board had ignored
the recommendations made by a committee, appointed to review the films,
which suggested that the film not be used in the junior high school, but that it
be retained in the curriculum of the high schoo1. 265 The plaintiffs, students at
257 Id. at 779.
"' Id. at 777.
"9 Id.
260 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
26'
	 plaintiffs in Sheck included students and parents of students. Id. at 681.
262 Id. at 681, 693.
265 Id. at 687.
264 Pratt, 670 F.2d at 773-74.
265 Id. at 774. The School District had a stated policy setting forth the procedures for
selection and review of instructional materials. The court explained this policy in a footnote:
This procedure provides for three levels of review of a citizen's complaint. First,
the objection to the material must be made to the person having control over the
questioned material. If the challenge is not resolved with the media specialist or
teacher, the citizen has a right to have his objections evaluated by a Committee for
Challenged Materials which is set up to review the complaint. The seven-person
Challenge Committee — composed of two citizens, two teachers, one media per-
son, one administrator and one student — has the duty to evaluate the material
based on the criteria set forth in the policy, and make a recommendation regarding
its future use. Finally, if the Challenge Committee's recommendation is un-
satisfactory, the challenger has a right to appeal to the school board.
Id. at 774 n.2.
According to this stated procedure, the Challenge Committee held a public meeting at
which the films were viewed and open discussion was held. Id, at 774. Teachers present at the
meeting also expressed their reasons for using the film in class. Id. At the conclusion of the
meeting, the Committee voted to recommend that the film be removed from the junior high
school curriculum, but retained at the high school level. Id. At a public meeting three weeks later,
the school board voted to reject a motion to "accept and confirm" the Committee's recommen-
dations, and further voted to completely eliminate the film and its trailer film from the school
district's curriculum. Id. Both votes were by a 4-3 margin, and "Nile board gave no reasons for
its decision." Id.
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the school, thereafter brought suit in the district court, and alleged a violation
of their first amendment right to receive information. 266 The district court
found that the school board had offered no evidence of a legitimate reason for
excluding the film, and ordered the film reinstated in the school district's cur-
riculum. 267
 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit where the decision of the district court was affirmed. 268
The Eighth Circuit held that the actions of the school board had violated
the students' first amendment right of access to information, stating: "What is
at stake is the right to receive information and be exposed to controversial ideas
— a fundamental First Amendment right." 269 The court recognized that
school boards generally are granted broad discretionary powers with which to
discharge their duties, 27° and that this discretion includes the authority to
determine the curriculum, teaching methods and educational materials used in
the school system."' The court stated, however, that this discretion is limited
by the first amendment right of students to be free from official conduct which
casts a "pall of orthodoxy" on classroom instruction. 272 The court suggested
that a cognizable first amendment claim arises if a book is excluded "to sup-
press an ideological or religious viewpoint with which the local authorities
disagree. " 273 Viewing the book removal cases as indistinguishable from the
case involving the removal of a film, 274 the court stated-that applicable to both
sets of facts was the principle that the banning of educational materials due to
their ideological and religious content is constitutionally impermissible. 275
Based on this reasoning, the court determined that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie violation because the objections of the board to the film
contained "religious overtones" and because the films had been removed due
to their "ideological content.' ,276
Under the standard of review adopted by the court in Pratt, once plaintiffs
had established a prima facie violation of the first amendment right of access to
information, the burden shifted to the school board to prove that a substantial
and reasonable government interest supported its actions. 277 The court did not
delineate what government interests it would consider specifically to be sub-
stantial, but it rejected the interests posited by the school committee in the in-
stant case. 278 The board had argued that the films removed were too violent for
266 Id. at 773.
267 Id.
the
	 at 780.
269 Id. at 779.
"0 Id. at 775.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 776. For a discussion of the origin of the concept of a "pall of orthodoxy," see
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
272 It at 776.
274 Id. at 776 n.6.
772 Id.
1" Id. at 776.
277 Id. at 777.
278 Id. at 778.
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a high school curriculum, and that this violence outweighed and overshadowed
the otherwise valuable and important themes contained in the films. 278 The cir-
cuit court affirmed the findings of the district court that the evidence to support
the school board's position was not sufficient to justify the removal action.'"
The circuit court further agreed with the district court's finding that the true
motive behind the removal was that the board and certain members of the com-
munity objected to the ideas contained in the films."' The circuit court con-
cluded that the board had eliminated the films "not because they contained
scenes of violence or because they distort the short story, but rather ...
because the majority of the board ... considered the films' ideological and
religious themes to be offensive. "282
 The court therefore held that since the
school board had failed to show a legitimate and substantial state interest in
removing the films, its action constituted an unjustified interference with the
students' first amendment rights of access to information.'"
The court suggested further that the actions of the school board in Pratt did
not satisfy the procedural requirements regarding acts which tend to restrict
freedom of expression and access. The court held that the first amendment re-
quires "that a school board act so that the reasons for its decision are apparent
to those affected. "284 In Pratt, the court observed that the school board had
failed clearly to inform the students and teachers in the school district exactly
what it was proscribing in removing the films from the curriculum. 285
 In such
circumstances the court observed that the symbolic effect of the removal may
be more significant than the resulting limitation of access to the story. 286 In-
stead of clearly stating specifically why the films were being removed, i.e., the
extent of unnecessary violence or the use of obscenity, the court suggested that
the school board in Pratt gave students and teachers the message that the ideas
contained in the films were unacceptable and should not be considered or dis-
cussed."' The court concluded that the consequences of such procedural defi-
ciencies are that speech is chilled and freedom of expression is restricted. 288
This reasoning of the Pratt court concerning procedural irregularities is
reminiscent of the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in Pico with one major
2" Id. at 777-78.
280 Id. at 778.
28"
282 Id.
2" Id. at 779.
284 Id. at 778.
285 Id. at 778-79.
2a6 Id. at 779.
"' Id. The court stated this proposition in the following manner:
The symbolic effect of removing the films from the curriculum is more significant
than the resulting limitation of access to the story. The board has used its official
power to perform an act clearly indicating that these ideas contained in the films
are unacceptable and should not be discussed or considered. The message is not
lost on students and teachers, and its chilling effect is obvious.
Id., citing Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 436 (2d Cir. 1980) (opinion of Newman, J.).
088 Pratt, 670 F.2d at 779.
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difference. In Pico, procedural irregularities and the attendant chilling effect
upon protected expression.was a requisite to the plaintiffs' showing of a prima
facie first amendment violation in book removal cases. 289 In Pratt, procedural
regularity was considered by the Eighth Circuit to be a burden which the school
board must carry in order to constitutionally restrict the students' first amend-
ment right of access to information. 290
A week after Pratt was decided, the United States District Court for the
District of Maine, following the reasoning of Minarcini and Pratt, established a
similar standard of review and burden for the plaintiffs in book removal cases.
In Sheck v. Baileyoille School Committee, 291
 the court recognized the existence of
students' first amendment rights of access to information in the "educational
environment of the secondary school library.' 292
 The court emphasized further
that the book removal actions of a school board are restrained by requirements
of procedural regularity imposed upon all agencies of the state by the four-
teenth amendment. 293
 The court concluded that the legitimacy of a school
board's actions in removing a book from a secondary school library may
ultimately depend upon "whether it could rationally conclude that exposure to
[the removed book] might be harmful to students." 294
 The issue before the
court in Sheck was whether injunctive relief should be granted to restore a book
entitled 365 Days to the shelves of the school library after it had been removed
by the local school board."'
In Sheck, the school board had voted to remove the book in question from
the library and to ban its possession anywhere on school property including
school buses. 296
 The plaintiffs, students and parents of students, brought this
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the actions of the
school board in removing the book had violated their first and fourteenth
amendments' rights."' In determining whether to issue an injunction ordering
the school board to return the removed book to the library shelves, the court
considered whether the plaintiffs had exhibited a likelihood of success on the
merits of their constitutional claim. 298
The court posited that in order to establish a prima facie case, the plain-
tiffs were required to demonstrate that their basic first amendment rights had
been directly and sharply implicated by the ban. 299 The court looked to
"9
 See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
290 Pratt, 670 F.2d at 778-79.
291 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
292 Id. at 687.
297 Id. at 690.
294 Id. at 691.
295 Id. at 680-81. The book removed was 365 Days by Ronald F. Glasser. The book is
described as a compilation of nonfictional Vietnam War accounts by American soldiers involved
in combat in that war. Id.
296 Id. at 683.
29? Id.
298 Id. at 684.
299 Id., thing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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previous book removal cases for guidance in determining whether the first
amendment rights of the students in Sheck had been directly and sharply im-
plicated by the school board's actions. Looking first to the standards of Zykan 3°°
and Pico,'" the court noted that under either of those standards the banning of
365 Days by the school board in Sheck could be viewed as not directly and sharp-
ly implicating basic constitutional rights. 302 The court observed, however, that
the Minarcini line of cases303 suggested an alternative standard. Under those
standards, the Sheck court noted that a violation of first amendment rights may
be present in this case. 304 Thus, because the book removal cases examined by
the court in Sheck did not present a uniform analytical framework by which to
evaluate book removal cases, the Sheck court examined the major issues in
detail in order to determine the most appropriate standard.
The court noted that in book removal cases it is not the right of expression
which is involved, but the right to receive information and ideas.'" The court
observed that the constitutional contours of this right to receive information
and ideas were rudimentary, 306 but suggested that where the right had been
recognized, the courts had emphasized the inherent societal importance of
"fostering the free dissemination of knowledge and ideas in a democratic socie-
ty." 307 The right of access, according to the court, does not depend upon the
existence of an attempted direct communication between speaker and recip-
ient, nor does it hinge on whether there are alternative means of obtaining the
information."' The court suggested that the importance of public education in
consiitutional jurisprudence mandates that the protections of the first amend-
ment not be limited to speakers only or to adults only. 309 Therefore, the court
concluded that the banning of a library book, "the least obtrusive conventional
communication resource available," should at least presumptively implicate
the reciprocal first amendment right of high school students to receive the infor-
mation and ideas contained in the books. 3 '°
30° For a discussion of the standard of review used in Zykan, see supra notes 212-15 and
accompanying text.
301 For a discussion of the standard of review proposed by the Second Circuit in Pico, see
supra notes 226-47 and accompanying text.
Sheck, 530 F. Supp. at 685. The court suggested that in Zykan the first amendment is
not implicated unless removal is part of a general purge of materials conflicting with views of or-
thodoxy imposed by the school board, or that the book is otherwise completely unavailable to the
students. Id. The court noted that in Pico no violation occurs unless circumstances are so unusual
and irregular as to create misunderstanding as to the scope and purpose of the ban resulting in a
chilling of other forms of expression. Id.
'°' For a discussion of the standard of review in Minarcini, see supra notes 156-67 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the other two cases in the Minarcini line, Salvail and Right to
Read, see supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
304 Shock, 530 F. Supp. at 685.
305 Id.
3" Id. at 686.
307 Id,
3" Id.
3D9 Id. at 686-87.
310 Id. at 687.
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The language of the Sheck opinion suggests that the very act of removal
should constitute a prima facie violation. The court stated that it would be
dangerous to presume that the action of the state in banning an educationally
valuable book does not directly and sharply implicate rights merely "because
the ban was not intended to suppress ideas."'" The court suggested that even
where the removal action is based strictly on vocabular considerations, such as
obscenity,''' as long as the words in the books convey ideas the federal courts
must "remain on first amendment alert. " 313 Therefore, due to the emphasis
placed on students' right of access in Sheck, it appears that the prima facie
threshold is crossed in Sheck when a book with proven educational value is
removed from a library. This would appear to be true even if the plaintiff had
not asserted that the ban was due to the intent of the :3chool board to suppress
certain ideas.'"
After determining that the information and ideas in books properly placed
in a school library are protected by the first amendment right of access to infor-
mation, the court addressed what procedural requirements may govern a
school board's decision to remove material from a library. 515 The court held
that a school board's actions must be consistent with the requirements of pro-
cedural regularity mandated by the fourteenth amendment. 316 This require-
ment prohibits arbitrary interference with the free flow of information and
ideas, and demands that public officials not exercise overbroad discretion in
censoring speech. 317 "Precise, ascertainable standards" must be used in the
government's regulation of free speech in order to prevent the chilling of
legitimate speech-related conduct."' The court held that these procedural re-
quirements extend to the actions of school boards in book removal cases.'"
According to the court in Sheck, the procedural requirements of the four-
teenth amendment may demand that the school board show that it rationally
could be concluded that exposure to the removed book might be harmful to the
students. 320 The court suggested further that a showing of harm resulting to
some students would not support a finding that the book is harmful to all
students in the school."' Thus, the court suggested that the means employed
by a school board to proscribe protected speech must be closely tailored to the
goal of eradicating the harm caused by the retention of the book or certain
passages therein."' The court found that the school board in Sheck acted pur-
"' Id.
32 Id. at 687-88.
"3 Id.
"4 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
313 Sheck, 530 F. Supp. at 689-93.
"d Id. at 690.
3" Id.
7 " Id.
Id. at 691.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 692-93. This discussion of a closely tailored means test is reflective of the pro-
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suant to no procedural ground rules. 323
 Therefore, the court determined that
the actions of the school board were seriously deficient due to their procedural
irregularity, arbitrariness, vagueness, and overbreadth. 524
Thus, Sheck and Pratt, the two latest lower federal court cases considering
the removal of educational materials from school libraries and curricula, repre-
sent a departure from the point of view espoused by the circuit courts in Zykan
and Pico, 325
 while returning to the philosophy of the Minarcini line of cases. 326
The Minarcini line of cases recognized the students' right of access to informa-
tion as the first amendment right implicated by the book removal decisions of
local school authorities. 327
 The Second Circuit in Pico, on the other hand, failed
to recognize the right of access and decided the case with reference to the first
amendment doctrine of freedom of expression. 328
 By doing so, the Second Cir-
cuit noted that in most book removal cases freedom of expression would not be
sharply or directly implicated. 329
 In finding for the plaintiffs under such a
standard, the facts presented in Pico constituted an atypical case — an excep-
tion as opposed to the rule. The Second Circuit held, in short, that the pro-
cedural irregularities attendant to the school boards' actions in Pico could result
in an impermissible chilling of protected expression. 3" In Pratt and Sheck, the
plaintiffs were presented with a less restrictive initial burden. Since the right
implicated was the right of access to information, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate only that a book with proven educational value was removed from
the library."' Once this is established, a double burden is shifted to the defend-
ant school board. The school board must prove not only that it had a legitimate
and substantial government interest in removing the book, 332
 but also that the
manner in which these interests were pursued was closely tailored to meet these
permissible educational goals. 333
The split among these courts is significant in several respects. First, the
courts differ in what first amendment right they consider implicated by book
removal decisions. While the Second Circuit in Pico analyzed book removals
with reference to the first amendment right of free expression, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Pratt and the Maine District Court in Sheck recognized and applied the
first amendment right of access to information. Second, while the courts in
Zykan and Pico supported a greater degree of discretion for local school
cedural burdens placed on the school board by the Second Circuit in Pico; see supra note 235 and
accompanying text.
"' Sheck, 530 F. Supp. at 692.
324 Id. at 692 n.19.
325 See supra notes 186-254 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 156-185 and accompanying text.
32 ' See supra notes 158-59, 171, 180 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 227-31, 237-38 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
"° See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
'3 ' See supra notes 269, 310 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
'99 See supra notes 315.24 and accompanying text.
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authorities, 334 the courts in Pratt and Sheck imposed greater restrictions upon
the exercise of this traditional discretion."' Finally, these differences in
philosophy resulted in two significantly different standards of review. Where
the Second Circuit's standard in Pica made it very difficult for student/plaintiffs
to establish a prima facie case,'" the standards adopted in Pratt and Sheck
lightened this burden significantly, and shifted the burden of demonstrating a
legitimate and substantial interest to the school board at a much earlier point in
time. 3 " In short, while the standards of Pico and Zykan favored defendant
school boards in book removal cases, the standards of Pratt and Sheck favored
the student/plaintiffs. In 1981, the school board in Pico petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari, and in October this petition was
granted.'" This was significant since the Supreme Court would now have an
opportunity to resolve the split among the lower federal courts, and Pico would
become the first book removal case argued before the highest court in the land.
A detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's findings in Pico follows in the next
section of this note.
D. The View of the United States Supreme Court
When the Supreme Court considered the question of secondary school
library book removals in Board of Education v. Pico, 339 the Justices were unable to
settle many of the substantive issues raised by the federal district and circuit
courts. This indecisiveness was due in part to the fact that the Court from the
outset significantly narrowed its scope of inquiry in .Pico. 349 Moreover, when
specific substantive issues were raised, such as the existence of a first amend-
ment right of access to information, the Justices were unable to arrive at a ma-
jority opinion, as is evidenced by the seven separate opinions filed in the
case."' This section examines the Supreme Court's decision in detail, review-
334 See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 269-87, 315-24 and accompanying text.
3" Under Pico the plaintiff must demonstrate that the school board's action infringed
upon its first amendment right of free expression. This was accomplished by showing that the ir-
regular and ambiguous nature of the school board's procedures resulted in impermissible first
amendment chilling. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
3 " By recognizing the first amendment right of access to information, a plaintiff was no
longer required to demonstrate, through the indirect and difficult route set forth in Pico, that its
free speech was chilled. Since the right of access became the operative constitutional right im-
plicated by the removal of a book, the plaintiff could reach the prima facie plateau by
demonstrating that the book had been removed, thereby denying access to it. See supra note 310
and accompanying text.
3" 102 S. Ct. 385 (1982).
"9 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
34°
 See text and notes at notes 346-54 infra.
3" Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, and was joined by Justice Marshall and
Justice Stevens. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and concurred with the judgment. Justice
White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment only. Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opin-
ion which was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Conner. Justices Rehnquist, Powell
and O'Conner also wrote separate dissenting opinions.
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ing the factual and procedural history of the case as well as analyzing the opin-
ions of the Justices including the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan. The sec-
tion concludes with a discussion of the important issues left unresolved after
Pico and the resultant lack of a clear standard of review by which federal courts
may resolve such disputes in the future.
The Supreme Court began its inquiry by noting the procedural history of
Pico. The Court observed that the District Court had granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant school board, reasoning that the board had
acted upon its belief that the removed books were vulgar and, although the
school board's decision may have reflected a misguided educational
philosophy, their actions did not constitute a "sharp and direct infringement of
any first amendment right."'" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that due to the irregular and unusual manner in which the
board affected the book removal, the board was obliged to demonstrate a
.reasonable basis for interfering with the students' first amendment rights.'"
The Second Circuit concluded that since the board had not presented sufficient
justification for their action, the students should have "been offered an oppor-
tunity to persuade a finder of fact that the ostensible justifications for [the
school board's] actions . . . were simply pretexts for the suppression of free
speech. " 344 The Supreme Court granted the school board's petition for cer-
tiorari.'"
Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion, noted at the outset that
three factors served to limit the prOper scope of the Supreme Court's inquiry in
Pico. First, since the books removed in Pico were library books, the Court was
not required to consider the issues raised in Meyer v. Nebraska 346 and Epperson v.
Arkansas, 34 ' where the authority of the state to regulate school curriculum and
classroom activities was questioned.'" Second, since Pico involved only book
removals .;
 the Court concluded that it need not consider the question of a
school board's power to regulate the acquisition of library books. 3" Third,
since Pico currently involved an appeal from the District Court's decision to
grant summary judgment, the Court reasoned that the substantive question
before it was constrained by the procedural posture of the case. 35 ° Consequent-
ly, the Court framed the issue before it in the form of two distinct questions.
342 Pico,102 S. Ct. at 2804, quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 397
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
343 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2804, citing Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980),
344 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2804-05, quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d at 417.
345 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981).
346 262 U.S. 390 (1923), see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
347 393 U.S. 97 (1968), discussed supra note 48.
348 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2805.
349 Id.
"° Id. at 2806. Since the appeal was from the summary judgment granted by the District
Court, the Court noted that: "We can reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and grant
petitioners' request for reinstatement of the summary judgment in their favor, only if we deter-
mine that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,' and that petitioners are 'entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. [sic] 56(c) [sic]." Id,
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First, the Court sought to decide whether the first a:rnendment imposed any
limitations upon the discretion of the school board to remove books from the
school library."' Second, construing the affidavits and other evidence
presented to the District Court most favorably to the student/plaintiffs, it ad-
dressed whether there was a genuine factual dispute about the school board's
violation of those limitations." 2 If either of the two questions were answered by
the Supreme Court negatively, the Court reasoned that the summary judgment
issued by the District Court should be reinstated."' If both questions were
answered in the affirmative, the Court observed that the judgment of the Sec-
ond Circuit should be affirmed and the case should be remanded for a trial on
the facts.""
Initially, Justice Brennan observed that school boards had traditionally
and legitimately exercised broad discretion in the management of local school
affairs."' This discretion included the important role of the school board in
transmitting community values by virtue of their choice of educational
policy. 356 Despite this high degree of discretion, however, the Court recognized
that local school boards must discharge their " 'important, delicate and highly
discretionary functions' within the limits and constraints of the First Amend-
ment. " 35] Among the first amendment rights enjoyed by students, according to
Justice Brennan, is the right to receive ideas."' Brennan observed that this
right had been recognized in a number of contexts by the Supreme Court, and
reasoned that this right was even more appropriate and important in the con-
text of the school library."'
In recognizing that secondary school students enjoyed a first amendment
right of access to information, Justice Brennan was careful to point out that not
all book removal decisions would violate this right. 36° The Court suggested that
if the school board had removed the books because they were "pervasively
vulgar," or because they were educationally unsuitable, they would have been
acting within the proper scope of their discretion. 361 These motives, according
951
352 Id.
"' Id.
354 Id.
" 5 Id.
3 " Id. The Court stated: "We are therefore in full agreement with petitioners that local
school boards must be permitted `to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to
transmit community values,' and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community interest
in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political.' " Id.
3" Id. at 2806-07.
35e
	 at 2808.
359 Id, Justice Brennan cited several cases in support of this proposition: Stanley v,
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), see supra note 77 and accompanying text; Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972), see supra note 79 and accompanying text; Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943), see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
'6° Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2810.
3" Id. The language used by Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion suggests that the
burden of proving legitimate motivation lies with the school board in these cases: " ... an un-
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to the Court, would not "carry the danger of an official suppression of ideas,"
and would therefore not violate the first amendment.'" If, however, the school
board had intended to deny students access to ideas with which the school board
members disagreed, and if such intent was a decisive factor in the removal
decision, 363
 then it could be said that the school board had violated the Con-
stitution in the exercise of its discretion.'" This standard arises from the
Court's belief that official action based upon such motivations would en-
courage the 'type of "officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned
in Barnette. ''365
The plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, therefore, decided two impor-
tant substantive issues which concerned the lower federal courts in the prior
decade. First, the opinion recognized that students enjoy a first amendment
right of access to information, and that this right extends into the secondary
school library context. 366
 Second, the opinion enunciated a specific standard of
review by which to determine whether the actions of a particular school board
infringed upon this newly recognized right. If the decisive factor in the board's
book removal decision was to deny students access to certain ideas with which
the school board disagreed, the students' first amendment right of access to in-
formation would have been violated. 367
 This violation is presumably the prima
facie violation which plaintiffs in book removal cases must demonstrate in
order to avoid an adverse summary judgment. Alternatively, if the school
board can demonstrate that such a motive was not decisive, and that their deci-
sion was based on a belief that the books were pervasively vulgar or that the
books were educationally unsuitable, there would be no first amendment viola-
tion.'" In applying this standard of review to the facts presented in Pico, Justice
Brennan concluded that the school board was not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. 369
 Consequently, the case was remanded for trial in order to
constitutional motivation•would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners [school
board] had decided to remove the books at issue because those books were pervasively vulgar....
And again ... if it were demonstrated that the removal decision was based solely upon the
'educational suitability' of the books in question." Id.
3" Id.
363 The Court, in a footnote, defined "decisive" in the following manner: "By 'decisive
factor' we mean a 'substantial factor' in the absence of which the opposite decision would have
been reached." Id. at 2810 n.22.
364 Id. at 2810.
365 Id. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), was
the case in which the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance requiring all students and
teachers to salute the flag. For a discussion of this case and its holding, see supra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text.
566 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
367 Id. at 2810.
366 Id.
369 In making this decision, the Court examined the procedure used by the school board
in effectuating its removal decision. The Court noted that: "Respondents alleged that in making
their removal decision petitioners ignored the 'advice of literary experts,' the views of 'librarians
and teachers within the Island Trees School system,' and the guidance of 'publications that rate
books for junior and senior high school students.' " Id, at 2812. The Court further observed the:
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determine the school board's motivation for removing the books.'"
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion likewise recognized the impor-
tance of the student's right of access to certain educational material."' Justice
Blackmun, however, determined this right to be narrower than envisioned by
the plurality."' He suggested that the state should not be under an obligation
to provide students with information and ideas, a concept which
-
 may arise
from a broadly stated right of access to information. 3 i3
 Justice Blackmun con-
tended that the student's rights were violated when a school board
discriminated between ideas, deciding to deny access to some for partisan or
political reasons. 374
 Therefore, Justice Blackmun modified slightly the stand-
ard of review advocated by the plurality, proposing that school officials may
not "remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or
social perspectives" contained therein when the action is motivated by the
school board's disapproval of the ideas involved. 373
 Because Justice Blackmun
believed that the plurality had adopted a standard similar to his own, he joined
in all but one part of the plurality opinion." 6
Justice White, concurring in the judgment only, noted that since the
Court of Appeals had determined that there was a material issue of fact sur-
rounding the underlying reasons behind the school board's action, the case
"Respondents also claimed that petitioners' decision was based solely on the fact that the books
were named on the PONY-U list received by petitioners [school board members] Ahrens, Martin
and Hughes, and that petitioners 'did not undertake an independent review of other books in the
[school] libraries.' " Id. The Court further observed that the Board ignored the advice of the
school superintendent to follow the established policy to handle such matters in the district, and
instead pursued the matter employing their own "extraordinary procedure .... " Id. Construing
the above-mentioned allegations along with other affidavits and evidentiary material in a manner
favorable to the student/respondents, the Court concluded that petitioners were not "entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Id. A critical material issue of fact regarding the school board's
motivations remained unresolved, and as a result a summary judgment was not in order. Id.
370 Id.
"I Id. at 2813-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
272 Id.
33 Id, at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
"4 Id. Justice Blackmun stated in this regard: " ... our precedents command the con-
clusion that the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disap-
prove of that idea for partisan or political reasons." Id,
375 Id.
376 Id. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
distinction between the standard of the plurality and that of Justice Blackmun appears to be il-
lusory. Both hold that a school board may not remove books for the purpose of denying access to
ideas with which the individual board members may disagree. Both also appear to suggest that
the plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case, must demonstrate that the school board
acted upon this impermissible motive. Justice Blackmun does specifically list more permissible
motives than does the plurality. He suggests that a school board may constitutionally remove
books for reasons including relevancy to the curriculum, quality of writing style, space and finan-
cial limitations, offensive language, themes which are psychologically and intellectually inap-
propriate for the age group, and a number of other politically neutral considerations. Id, at 2815
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Blackmun himself does perceive one major difference between the standard
espoused by the plurality and his own: "In effect, my view presents the obverse of the plurality's
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should be remanded for a factual determination of those issues and a summary
judgment should not be granted."' He suggested that it was not necessary to
reach the constitutional issues and therefore declined to join in the plurality's
constitutional analysis. 378 Justice White's position is significant in that it
prevented a majority from being formed on the resolution of the critical
substantive issues of the first amendment right of access to information and the
specific standard of review to be adopted. As it stands, only four Justices ruled
in favor of recognizing the right of access, and only four submitted a standard
of review . 379
In a dissenting opinion, 38° Chief Justice Burger suggested initially that
nowhere had the Supreme Court ever recognized a first amendment right of ac-
cess with respect to secondary school students."' The Chief Justice expressed
the opinion that such a right would impose upon the government an obligation
to provide students with continuing access to particular books. 382 The Chief
Justice suggested that prior cases discussing a "right to receive information"
did not grant the "concomitant right to have those ideas affirmatively provided
at a particular place by the government."'" He suggested that since the school
board is an elected body, they are, in essence, expressing the views of the com-
munity which placed them in office. 384 Further, the Chief Justice reasoned that
since the students could obtain the removed books elsewhere — book stores,
public libraries — there was no need to impose upon a school board an obliga-
tion to provide such materials."' Finally, the Chief Justice questioned the
plurality's application of a right of access to the removal of books only, and
suggested that such a right may be expanded into a right to have certain books
acquired by school boards."' The Chief Justice concluded that book removal
analysis: while the plurality focuses on the failure to provide information, I find crucial the
State's decision to single out an idea for disapproval and then deny access to it." Id. at 2814 n.2
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This observation by Justice
Blackmun is particularly interesting since the plurality expressly stated: " ... nothing in our
decision today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to
the libraries of their schools. Because we are concerned in this case with the suppression of ideas,
our holding today affects only the discretion to remove books." Id. at 2810 (emphasis the Court's).
It appears most likely that Justice Blackmun fears that in future cases where the Court may be
asked to rule on the constitutionality of a school board deciding not to add certain books to the
school library, the plurality would differ in its application of the first amendment right of access
significantly from how he would see it applied. In the context of book removal cases, however,
the standards of the plurality and Justice Blackmun are effectively the same.
3" Id. at 2816 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
"fi Id. at 2817 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
"2 These four include the three Justices joining the plurality opinion as well as Justice
Blackmun.
"° This dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Powell
and O'Conner.
"I Id. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3 ' 2 Id.
3" Id,
3" Id, at 2820-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
385 Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3"6 Id.
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decisions were well within the constitutional scope of authority of the school
boards, and that such decisions should not be overturned by federal judges. 3 e'
Justice Powell, in a separate dissenting opinion, echoed the concerns of
the Chief Justice with regard to recognition of a broad first amendment right of
access to information in the context of public school libraries. 388 He further
suggested that a duly appointed school board should remain free to make such
decisions, and should not be constitutionally required to "promote ideas and
values repugnant to a democratic society or to teach such values to
children." 389 Justice Powell attached to his opinion an Appendix containing
excerpts from the removed books which, presumably, he considered to be
vulgar or repugnant. 39° It is apparent that Justice Powell was concerned with
the content of these books, and it is likely that the nature of these phrases in-
fluenced his decision in voting to uphold the power of the school board to
remove such material.
Justice Rehnquist began his dissenting opinion by suggesting that the
plurality opinion had construed the facts of the case more favorably to the
students than they had done themselves. 3" After reviewing the exerpts provid-
ed in the affidavits and evidence, he concluded that eight of the nine books
removed contained "demonstrable amounts" of profanity and vulgarity, and
the ninth contained nothing which could be termed partisan or political. 392
Consequently, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the school board had acted in a
permissible manner even under the standard set forth by the plurality.'"
Justice Rehnquist next distinguished the dual miles of the government as
sovereign and educator, emphasizing his belief that different levels of scrutiny
may be appropriate depending upon which role the state was undertaking in a
given factual setting.'" In its role as educator, Justice Rehnquist concurred
with the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp. 395 that school boards should be allowed to make educational decisions
"based upon their personal social, political and moral views. "396 Since the
"7 Id.
See
	
at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that " ... this new found
right finds no support in the First Amendment precedents of this Court." Id.
3°9
	 at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39° Id. at 2823-27 (Powell, J., dissenting).
391 Id. at 2827-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist notes here the local rule
9(g) of the district court which required the parties to set forth their own version of the facts in the
case. Id. He suggested that the respondents were entitled to have these facts presented to the
Supreme Court for review, but were not entitled to an interpretation of the facts more favorable
than contained in their own rule 9(g) statement. Id. at 2828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist contends that this more favorable interpretation was granted by the plurality in this
case. Id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
393 Id. at 2829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"5 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the decision of the Seventh Circuit
in Zykan, see supra notes 189-219 and accompanying text.
"6 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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school board in this case was merely effectuating educational policy and not
proscribing certain materials to society as a whole, such actions in the role of
educator "do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions by the
government as sovereign."'" Justice Rehnquist viewed the actions of the
school board in Pico to be no more than part and parcel of the daily educational
decisions school boards must face when confronted with limited resources of
time, space and money.'" Moreover, since the removed books could be ob-
tained elsewhere by the students, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "the
benefits to be gained from exposure to those ideas have not been foreclosed by
the State. "399
Justice Rehnquist, like the Chief Justice and Justice Powell, expressed
discomfort with the plurality's recognition of a first amendment right of access
to information in the context of secondary school libraries. 400 He observed that
other cases involving the first amendment and education were limited to the
right of student expression, and did not support recognition of a right of access
to information."' He further observed that those Supreme Court cases which
did discuss the right of access to information did so in contexts other than
public education, and concluded that nowhere had the Supreme Court ruled
that high school students possess such a right."' Justice Rehnquist concluded
his discussion of the right of access by rejecting the contention of the plurality
that such a right flowed as a natural corollary of the first amendment doctrine
of freedom of expression in this case."' He suggested that in those cases which
recognized such a right to receive ideas, it was first established that there ex-
isted a willing speaker whose right to speak or communicate those ideas was
constitutionally protected. 441
 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that it would be
ludicrous to "contend that all authors have a constitutional right to have their
books placed in junior high school and high school libraries.""' Without such
a right, however, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Supreme Court precedent
would not recognize the reciprocal right to receive information. 406
197 Id. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist illustrated his point by ex-
ample: "Had petitioners been the members of a town council, I suppose all would agree that, ab-
sent a good deal more than is present in this record, they could not have prohibited the sale of
these books by private booksellers within the municipality." Id. at 2829 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Considering the educational role played by a school board, however, Justice Rehnquist
concludes that a school board must be given a far greater deal of discretion and that book
removals in the context of school libraries would be, therefore, constitutional. Id. at 2830 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
398 Id. at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
399 Id. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'°° Id. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
401 Id. Justice Rehnquist mentioned two other Supreme Court cases dealing with the
first amendment in the context of public education: Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
402 Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
403 Id. at 2831-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40' Id. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4°' Id:
406 Id.
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist contended that the very role public education
plays in society supports"the proposition that school boards should be granted a
high degree of discretion in discharging their responsibilities."' He suggested
that schools teach students the basic skills necessary to function in society and
further inculcate the fundamental values "necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system. "408 Consistent with these educational goals, he
stressed, is the requirement of an orderly exposure to information relevant for
the individual development of the student*" Since secondary education must
be targeted toward the teaching of basic skills and ideas, Justice Rehnquist
claimed that a high school library cannot provide the same type of "free-
wheeling inquiry" possible in a public or university library.'" Concluding,
Justice Rehnquist stated that since the removal of a library book should be con-
sidered a routine decision school boards are forced to make when confronted
with the aforementioned goals, " . . the First Amendment right to receive in-
formation simply has no application to the one public institution which, by its
very nature, is a place for the selective conveyance of ideas. , )411
Justice O'Conner, in her brief dissent, observed that the act of removing
books from school libraries is constitutionally within the powers of local school
boards provided it does not interfere with the right of the students to "read the
material and to discuss it. "k12 Justice O'Conner further suggested that
although she may not have personally agreed with all aspects of the decision of
the school board in Pico, she did not believe the courts should make decisions
properly relegated to elected school board members.*" Given the brevity of her
opinion, determining the nature and extent of her cryptic reference to a stu-
dent's "right to read," is impossible. 414 Even if she does implicitly recognize
some type of right of access to information, she was persuaded in this case that
any such right was protected by the availability of the removed books outside
the school library.
In analyzing the import of Board of Education v. Pico for the resolution of
future book removal actions brought in the federal courts, it is important to
bear in mind that no five Justices were able to agree on the substantive con-
stitutional issues presented in the plurality opinion. With regard to the
students' right to receive information, only four Justices can be said to have
recognized this right.'" Three Justices can be said to have expressly rejected
4°2 Id. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4°9 Id.
4°9 Id.
+ 1 ° Id.
411 id.
412 Id. at 2835 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
413 Id.
414 Id.
419 These four include the three Justices signing the plurality opinion as well as Justice
Blackmun. See id. at 2808-09; Id. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
1520	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1471
the application of a right of access to book removal cases, 415 one has mentioned
the existence of an undefined "right to read," 417 and one has expressed no
opinion on the constitutional issues presented in the case.'" Concerning the
standard of review appropriate in book removal cases, only three Justices ex-
pressly concurred in that posed by Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, while
another Justice offered a slightly modified version.'" Taking the plurality
opinion as the present view of the Supreme Court, a plaintiff, in order to
establish a prima facie constitutional violation, must demonstrate that the
school board intended to suppress certain partisan or political ideas unfavorable
to its individual members:cm In turn, a school board may prove that it acted
legitimately by removing books based on the belief that they were pervasively
vulgar or that they were educationally unsuitable for retention in the library. 421
In light of the split in the Court over these substantive constitutional
issues, and due to the inability of the Court to form a majority on one par-
ticular standard of review, three major issues involved in book removal cases
remain clouded after Board of Education v. Pico. First, it remains unclear what
first amendment right, if any, is implicated when a school library book is
removed from a library. One possibility is a broad right of access to informa-
tion, recognized by the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan 422 and espoused by
the courts in Minarcini, 423 Prate". and Sheek. 4" Another possibility is the more
limited right not to be denied access to information based on partisan political
considerations, expressed in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Pica. 426
Finally, it may be that the availability of the removed books precludes the ap-
plication of a right of access altogether, 427 and these cases must be analyzed by
reference to the more traditional first amendment doctrine of freedom of ex-
pression . 428
Secondly, given the split among the Justices, the appropriate standard of
review in future book removal cases remains unclear. The Supreme Court did
not discuss what type of evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that a school
416 These three include Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See id.
at 2818 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Id. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at 2830 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
17 Justice O'Conner made reference to an undefined "right to read." Id. at 2835
(O'Conner, J., dissenting).
4" See id. at 2817 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
4'9 Id. at 2810; Id. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
420 Id. at 2810.
421 Id.
ki. at 2808-09.
423 Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
424 Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1982).
425 Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp. 679, 687 (D. Me. 1982).
426 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2814 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
427 Id. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42a See generally President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.
1972).
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board has intended to suppress unfavorable ideas. Moreover, when consider-
ing whether to remove certain works from a school library, it is unclear
whether school boards are limited to considerations of vulgarity and educa-
tional quality429
 or if they may also permissibly remove books for reasons such
as a lack of shelf space or poor physical condition of the book itself. 43°
Finally, the question of procedural regularity was not even discussed by
the Supreme Court. Whether school board decisions, tainted by procedural ir-
regularities, should be considered constitutionally deficient is uncertain."'
While some courts have considered a showing of procedural regularity to be a
part of the school board's burden in justifying their book removal decisions, 432
others have ruled that procedural irregularities may be exposed by plaintiffs in
establishing a prima facie constitutional violation."' Must school boards hold
public hearings before deciding to remove books from school libraries, 434 or
may a school board make removal decisions based solely upon their personal
social, political or moral views?"'
In short, except for the plurality opinion, joined in substance by at most
four of the nine Supreme Court Justices, lower courts are left with no
authoritative guidelines according to which the complicated and controversial
issues presented in typical book removal cases may be resolved.
Ill. RECOMMENDATION
Given the rather confused state of the law in this area following Board of
Education v. Pico, this note now draws upon the principles discussed by the
Supreme Court as well as by other federal courts in cases discussed in prior sec-
tions, and offers the following recommendation concerning the appropriate
methodology for resolving future book removal disputes. This recommended
standard for reviewing whether book removal decisions violate first amend-
ment rights consists of three parts. First, it is necessary to set forth what the
plaintiff must prove in order to establish a prima facie constitutional violation.
Second, after the prima facie threshold has been crossed, it must be asked
whether the state had a sufficient government interest in removing the book to
justify interference with constitutional rights. Third, if the school board proves
429 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct, 2799, 2810 (1982).
439 See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir.
1976).
431 The existence of procedural irregularities was considered determinative by at least
one court in deciding a book removal challenge. See Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 414-15
(2d Cir. 1980).
432 See, e.g., Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee, 530 1'. Supp. 679, 689-90 (D. Me.
1982).
4" See, e.g., Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
434 Public meetings were held prior to the final book removal decision in at least one
case. See Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1982).
4" This was held to be permissible in at least one book removal case. See, e.g., Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980). This principle was
quoted approvingly by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Board of Education v. Pico.
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2829-30 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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it had such an interest, it must be determined whether the means used to effect
this regulation were closely tailored to meet the asserted government interest.
A. Prima Facie Violation
It is submitted that a prima facie violation of the first amendment right of
access to information is established when a plaintiff demonstrates: (1) a book of
educational value has been removed from the school library by the school
board or any local official acting in his capacity as a representative of the school
board or of the state; and (2) by removing the book, the school board intended
to suppress access to ideas which were unfavorable to members of the school
board.
This standard of review rests upon the recognition that public high school
students enjoy a limited first amendment right of access to the information and
ideas contained in school library books. Recognition of an absolute right of ac-
cess in the public school library context would result in at least two undesirable
consequences. First, it would render a school board susceptible to a federal
lawsuit every time it decided to remove a book from a school library shelf,
regardless of the motivation behind the removal decision. Second, recognition
of an absolute right of access logically, if not likely, would result in the imposi-
tion of a constitutionally based duty to acquire books upon a school board. 436
Given the inevitable physical and financial constraints which confront school
boards daily, this result would be no less than disastrous.
In contrast, the limitation placed on the application of the right of access
to book removal cases submitted by this note is desirable for several reasons.
Under the proposed standard of review, in order to establish a prima facie first
amendment violation, a plaintiff must prove, through the presentation of
evidence to a finder of fact, that the desire to deny access to ideas disagreeable
to board members was a motivating factor behind the school board's book
removal decision. This prima facie test avoids the problems mentioned above,
and further insures that book removal decisions are made in the best interest of
the students and not as part of a personal moral or political crusade by certain
school board members."' While preserving the traditional, legitimate authori-
"6 This potential consequence of a broadly recognized right of access to information was
noted by two Justices in their dissenting opinions in Pico. See, e.g., Bd, of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S.
Ct. 2799, 2819 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
497 Judge Sifton, writing for the plurality in Pico at the circuit court level, stated in this
regard:
Where, however, as in this case, evidence that the decisions made were based on
defendants' moral or political beliefs appears together with evidence of procedural
and substantive irregularities sufficient to suggest an unwillingness on the part of
school officials to subject their political and personal judgments to the same sort of
scrutiny as that accorded other decisions relating to the education of their charges,
an inference emerges that political views and personal taste are being asserted not
in the interests of the children's well-being, but rather for the purpose of
establishing those views as the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the
particular community.
Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 417 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ty of school boards to direct local educational policy, 438 this standard protects
the rights of students to enjoy continued access to educationally relevant books
which have been placed in their school libraries. 439
 Finally, by allowing plain-
tiffs to cross the prima facie threshold by proving that an impermissible motive
was but one of many possible factors leading to a book removal decision, school
boards employing such facially tainted decision-making procedures will be
prevented from successfully having these cases "nipped in the bud" by early
dismissal orders prompted by unduly difficult prima facie burdens. 44°
B. Substantial and Legitimate Government Interests
Under the proposed standard of review, once the plaintiff has established
a prima facie constitutional violation, the book removal actions of the school
board are considered to be presumptively violative of the first amendment right
4" See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
439
 In recognizing the students' first amendment rights of access to information, Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality in Board of Education v. Pico, stated: " ... the right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press and political freedom." Board of Education v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982). Justice
Brennan, discussing the relevance of the right of access to book removal cases specifically, stated:
" the special characteristics of the school library make that environment especially appropriate
for the recognition of the First Amendment rights of students." Id. at 2809 (emphasis the
Court's).
4" This point is evidenced by observing the results reached by courts in various book
removal cases, and by comparing their individual standards of review. In the 1972 case of Presi-
dent's Council v. Community School Board, the Second Circuit did not recognize the students'
first amendment right of access, but rather decided the case by reference to the more traditional
first amendment doctrine of freedom of expression. In dismissing the plaintiff's action, the court
stated: "To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents a constitutional issue, par-
ticularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or thought, is a proposi-
tion we cannot accept." President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d
Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit, in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., set forth a
prima facie test which required plaintiffs to demonstrate that local school officials had begun to
"substitute rigid and exclusive indoctrination for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make
pedagogic choices regarding matters of legitimate dispute." Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980). In dismissing the plaintiff's action, the court
observed that the students had not demonstrated a systematic effort to "exclude a particular type
of thought" from the school library. Id. The court further noted that the plaintiffs could obtain
the books from other sources, and as a result the board had not "deprived them of all contact
with the material in question „ " Id. In these cases where the courts have imposed a particularly
difficult burden of proof on the plaintiffs initially, the cases have been dismissed without reaching
a discussion of the actual reasons for the removal of the specific books which originally gave rise
to the lawsuit.
In contrast, courts which have recognized a first amendment right of access to informa-
tion have generally reached the second level of constitutional analysis which probes whether the
school board had a legitimate and substantial government interest in deciding to remove certain
books from the school libraries. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2810-11 (1982);
Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir, 1982); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976). These courts have actually examined the
reasons given by a school board for removing the books in question, and have been able to reach
the true merits of the case. Moreover, the courts espousing less burdensome requirements at the
prima facie stage have invariably found in favor of the student/plaintiffs.
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of access to information."' At this point, the burden of proof shifts to the school
board to demonstrate that it had a substantial and legitimate government in-
terest in removing the book(s) in question." 2 In order to rebut the presumption
established by the plaintiff's prima facie showing, the school board must prove
that the stated legitimate and substantial government interest constituted the
decisive factor in its decision to remove the book. 443 In opposition to this con-
tention of the school board, the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that the reasons offered by the school board are mere "pretexts"
to justify removal actually based on impermissible grounds.*** In the final
analysis, a court will be presented with one decisive question: Was the decisive
factor in the school board's book removal decision the legitimate government
interest suggested by the school board, or the impermissible motivation to deny
access to protected ideas? If the decisive factor is found to be the legitimate
government interest, the book removal decision should be upheld. If the
removal decision was primarily motivated by the illegitimate desire on the part
of school board members to deny students' access to certain protected ideas,
the actions of the school board should be struck down as an unconstitutional
denial of the students' first amendment rights of access to information.
In general, courts have discussed four types of government interests which
may justify a school board's removal of a book, and this note now recommends
the adoption of these interests into a standard of review. First, if the school
board can prove that it was primarily motivated by the belief that the books
were pervasively vulgar 445 or obscene , 145 the removal decision should be
4" One court went as far as to suggest that the very removal of a library book, "the least
obtrusive conventional communication resource available," should "at least presumptively im-
plicate the reciproCal first amendment right of secondary students to receive the information and
ideas there written." Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp. 679, 687 (D. Me.
1982).
442 One court recently set forth this shifting of burdens in the following manner:
"Therefore, to avoid a finding that it acted unconstitutionally, the board must establish that a
substantial and reasonable governmental interest exists for interfering with the student's right to
receive information." Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1982).
This shifting of the burden to the state is further reflective of the form taken by standards
of review in equal protection cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)
(challenge to Oklahoma drinking age claiming unconstitutional gender-based classification). In
setting forth the test, the Court in Craig stated that: "To withstand constitutional challenge
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." Id.
"' The term "decisive factor" here is given the same meaning it was accorded by the
Supreme Court in Pico. "By 'decisive factor' we mean a 'substantial factor' in the absence of
which the opposite decision would have been reached." Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799,
2810 n.22 (1982).
444 See, e.g., Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 418 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit
in Pico ruled that even if the defendant school board had successfully demonstrated a substantial
and legitimate government interest in removing the books in question, the plaintiffs should then
be given an "opportunity to persuade the finder of fact that the proffered justifications were mere
pretext for an intentional violation of plaintiff's rights." Id.
+" Id. at 2810. In this regard, the Court stated: " ... an unconstitutional motivation
would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the books at
issue because those books were pervasively vulgar." Id.
446 The Supreme Court has applied a "variable obscenity" standard to minors in the
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upheld. Second, certain physical limitations involved with the operation of a
school library may justify the removal of certain works. There are three specific
circumstances in which removal should be allowed: (1) when a copy of the book
becomes worn out; (2) when a book becomes educationally obsolete; and (3)
when limitations on shelf space in the library require the removal of some
books. 447
 Third, the actions of school boards should be upheld if it can be
demonstrated that allowing the book(s) to remain on the shelves would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school." 448 Finally, if the school board can
prove that it was primarily motivated by the belief that the book in question
was "psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group,"*" the
removal decision should be upheld.
The government interests listed above not only exhaust those generally
recognized by the courts to be "legitimate and substantial," but also provide
local school authorities with sufficient room in which to effectuate sound educa-
tional policy. By allowing school boards to maintain discipline, manage the
physical operation of a library, and protect minors from undue exposure to
vulgar and obscene material, it would appear that the traditional authority of
school boards to protect the interests and well-being of secondary school
students is preserved. Moreover, the adoption of such a standard would pro-
vide local school authorities with a much needed set of guidelines within which
they may make book removal decisions confident that their actions would with-
stand a constitutional challenge. The recommended standard, therefore, would
provide this area of the law with both predictability and flexibility, recognizing
the legitimate interests of school boards and secondary school students alike.
C. Closely Tailored Means Test
As the final step in this model standard of review, it is recommended that
courts adopt a closely tailored means test under which to scrutinize local book
removal decisions. Simply stated, this test asks "whether the policy is as nar-
rowly drawn as may reasonably be expected so as to advance the societal in-
terests that justify it, or, to the contrary, does it unduly restrict protected [ac-
cess] to an extent greater than is essential to the furtherance of those
interests?" 450
 Under such a test, any otherwise legitimate book removal deci-
sion which is overbroad in its scope, i.e., restricting access to more material
past. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
4" See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2815 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541
F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1976).
448
 This state interest has been held sufficient to justify a school board's restriction of
student speech, and, by analogy, should certainly suffice to legitimize restrictions imposed on the
more limited student right of access to information. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
"9
 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2815 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
"° Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 415 (2d Cir. 1980).
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than is necessary to attain the permissible government interests submitted by
the school board, would be struck down as violative of the first amendment
right of access to information. The inclusion of such a means test in this stand-
ard of review is based upon the principle that "the First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, [and therefore] government may regulate in
the area only with narrow specificity."' This type of means test further acts to
prevent the chilling of protected speech caused by irregular, ambiguous and
overbroad book removal policies
CONCLUSION
In general, school boards, for various reasons, have removed objec-
tionable books and periodicals from high school libraries across the country. In
a few instances, plaintiffs have challenged the book removal decisions on first
amendment grounds, contending that the removal of the books violated the
rights of students in the school. In these cases, courts have wrestled with con-
cepts of "academic freedom," "the marketplace of ideas," and the yet
undefined "right to read." The early courts analyzed book removal cases by
reference to the traditional first amendment doctrine of freedom of expression,
and, not surprisingly, were unable to see how the removal of a book from a
school library inhibited the student's right to speak. Increasingly, however,
federal district and circuit courts began to incorporate the newly developing
right of access into the book removal cases. By early 1982, a strong line of cases
had developed recognizing the secondary school student's first amendment
right of access to information, while other courts refused to recognize or apply
the right. Consequently, the state of the law was confused and no uniform
standard of review existed.
In the summer of 1982, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to dispel
some of the confusion surrounding book removal litigation when it granted cer-
tiorari in Board of Education v. Pico. The Court, however, was unable to form a
majority opinion and resolve this confusion. The Court split evenly on the issue
of the first amendment right of access, and the seven separate opinions set forth
no less than four standards of review, none of which could command the sup-
port of more than four Justices. The plurality opinion, signed by three Justices
and agreed to in principle by another, did recognize a right of access to infor-
mation, and held that school boards could not remove books in order to deny
students access to ideas found to be personally disagreeable to individual school
board members. Yet, the plurality opinion neither defined the parameters of
the newly recognized right nor established a detailed framework of its proposed
standard of review. After Board of Education v. Pico, therefore, federal courts are
still left with no clear direction for the resolution of book removal disputes.
4" Id. at 416, quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967). For a
discussion of Keyishian, see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
452 Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 415 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Although the aftermath of Board of Education v. Pico is impossible to predict
with certainty, it is clear that book removal decisions by local school boards will
continue to be challenged in the federal courts. This note has presented a
recommended standard of review by which federal courts may evaluate these
constitutional claims in the future. Based upon the recognition of a limited first
amendment right of access to information, this recommended standard of
review initially requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the school board was
motivated, at least in part, by the desire to deny access to ideas found to be per-
sonally objectionable to individual school board members. After establishing a
prima facie violation in this manner, the school board must now assume the
burden of proving not only that a legitimate and substantial government in-
terest existed concerning their book removal decision, but that this permissible
interest was the decisive factor in their ultimate removal decision. In addition,
the school board must demonstrate that the means employed in their removal
decision constituted the "least restrictive means" of attaining the legitimate
government interest cited. If the school board is successful in carrying this
burden of proof, their book removal decision should be sustained. If they fail,
their decision should be declared unconstitutional and the removed literature
should be ordered placed back on the library shelf. The ultimate goal of this
recommended standard is to ensure that local school boards, when deciding to
remove books from school libraries, are doing so in the best interest of the
students while not unconstitutionally restricting the students' first amendment
rights of access to important and educationally relevant information.
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